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I. INTRODUCTION

Something old, something new
Something borrowed, something blue
And a silver sixpence in her shoe.'
This old English rhyme describes what a bride should wear on
her wedding day and helps illustrate marriage's rich tradition and
history. In recent decades, Americans have argued about who may
marry and what marriage actually signifies-or should signify-in
both legal and philosophical terms.2 For almost as long, the rising
divorce rate and increasing numbers of single parent families have
fed concerns about the present viability of marriage as an
institution that promotes domestic stability and economic security.'

' These are the items that a bride takes with her to her wedding to bring good luck. Ask
Yahoo!, http://ask.yahoo.com/20031027.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). We omit the
sixpence from the following analysis, as the United Kingdom abandoned the coin in 1971.
Chard Coins, The Story of the Sixpence, http://www.24carat.co.uk/sixpencesstoryframe.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007). Commentators use the other familiar terms from this rhyme
often in their discussions of marriage. See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY
70, 123 (2005) (utilizing this rhyme to discuss central role of marriage in Western Europe).
2 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987) (holding that right of inmate to marry
is one protected by Constitution); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (finding that
right to marry is of fundamental importance and cannot be interfered with significantly);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that individual has choice of whether to
marry someone of another race); see also Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and
Democracy: Beyond Marriage?,32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 387 (2003) (illustrating role of sex
stereotypes in institution of marriage); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOzO L.
REV. 2081, 2081 (2005) (discussing content and scope of right to marry). Of course, such
discussions have even earlier roots. See, e.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS

156-67 (1929) (advocating "trial" marriage).
' Statistics regarding the divorce rate vary. The U.S. Census Bureau reported that in
2004 there were 3.7 divorces for every 7.4 marriages. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 93 tbl. 117 (2005), availableat http://www.census.
gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/vitstat.pdf. In 2002, the National Center for Health Statistics
reported that 43% of first marriages end in separation or divorce. ROSE M. KRIEDER & JASON
M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND

DIVORCES: 1996, at 17 n. 17 (2002), availableat http'//www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p70-80.
pdf. A year earlier, it reported that in 1995, 33% of first marriages ended within ten years.
MATIHEW D. BRAMLETT & WILLIAM D. MARSHER, NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ADVANCE DATA No. 323-FIRST MARRIAGE
DISSOLUTION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE: UNITED STATES 5 (2001), available at http://www.

cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf. One website declares that despite the popular belief that
approximately 50% of marriages end in divorce, the U.S. divorce rate has declined to its
current level of 38%. Americans for Divorce Reform, Divorce Rates, http'//www.
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Last year, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that almost 50% of
household heads were not married in 2004 4 -up from almost 45% in
1990. 5 If this trend continues, unmarried heads of households will
soon outnumber those who are married.' This trend has already
become a reality in subsets of the population. For example, in
African American families, unmarried heads of households have
been the majority since 2000.' Although the National Center for
Health Statistics reports that divorce rates are high, unmarried
couples who cohabitate have an even lower success rate.' While onethird or more marriages will end in divorce within ten years, nearly
90% of relationships of unmarried couples who cohabitate will not
last that long.9
Couples who marry do so for a variety of conscious and
unconscious goals: (1) to demonstrate love and commitment, both to
each other and in the eyes of the community; (2) to secure the
parentage and welfare of their children; (3) to create an efficient and
unified domestic economic enterprise; and (4) to obtain legal rights

divorcereform.org/rates.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
4 The actual figure was 49.8%. U.S. Census Bureau, 2004 American Community Survey,
General Demographic Characteristics: 2004, http://factfinder.census.gov/ (follow American
Community Survey "get data" hyperlink; then follow 2004 American Community Survey
"Data Profiles" hyperlink; then follow "Show Result" button) (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
The actual figure was 44.9%.
U.S. Census Bureau, Household and Family
Characteristics: 1990, http://factfinder.census.gov/ (follow Decennial Census "get data"
hyperlink; follow 1990 Census tab; follow 1990 Summary Tape file 1 (STF1)-100-Percent data
"Geographic Comparison" hyperlink; follow"Show Result" button) (lastvisited Feb. 15,2007).
6 Sam Roberts, It's Official to Be MarriedMeans to Be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2006, § 1, at 22.
7 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Releases Update on Country's
African American Population (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/incomewealth/000403.html
(reporting that based on
estimates for year 2000 only 48% of African American families were headed by married
couples).
8 Press Release, Natl Ctr. for Health Statistics, New Report Sheds Light on
Trends and
Patterns in Marriage, Divorce, and Cohabitation (July 24,2002), availableat http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/pressroom/02news/div marcohab.htm; see also Marsha Garrison, Reviving
Marriage:Should We? Could We? 20 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 43, 2005),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=829825 (arguing that cohabitation "represents only a
station-stop on the way to either marriage or separation").
9 See Garrison, supra note 8 (stating that "only about 10% of cohabitants who do not
marry are still together five years later"). For an informative discussion of cohabitation and
its affects on children, see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage
Matter to the Nurturing of Children, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 868-69 (2005).
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and benefits based on their marital status. 10 Given that these
marital goals are generally laudable," but also acknowledging that
neither marriage nor cohabitation actually facilitates these goals for
vast numbers of Americans, 2 one wonders whether another form of
private ordering would better achieve these goals.
This Article explores a domestic partnership model based on
business partnership law as a vehicle to better serve modern couples
and their families in private relationship ordering. 3 It proposes a
10

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987); see also EvAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE

MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MARRY 4-15 (2004) (discussing
various goals of marital partners). For a discussion of state and federal government support
of marriage and married people, see Anita Bernstein, ForandAgainst Marriage:A Revision,
102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 141, 146, 149, 180 (2003). For two controversial discussions of the
advantages of marriage, see generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY
(2000) and JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, STRAIGHTS, AND
GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004). In 1997, Congress's General Accounting Office first cataloged the
laws associated with marriage. It found 1,049 such associated laws. Letter from Barry R.
Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, GAO/ OGC-97-16DefenseofMarriageAct (1997),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive1997/og97016.pdf. An updated report from 2003
found 1,138 laws conferring rights or benefits associated with marriage. Letter from Dayna
K Shah, Ass. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Accounting Office, to Sen. Bill Frist, Senate Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-353R Defense of MarriageAct: Update to PriorReport (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
11 Citing statistics that children of low income married families are more financially
secure and emotionally healthy, both Democrats and Republicans have favored plans to
increase marriage among low income persons. Bush May ProposeMarriagePush,CBS NEWS,
Jan. 14, 2004, availableat http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/14/politics/main593122.
shtml. In 2004, President Bush announced a 1.5 billion dollar initiative to that end. Robert
Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans 1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at AI; see also U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Admin. for
Children and Families, ACF Healthy Marriage Initiative Mission Statement (2005)
(discussing purpose of Healthy Marriage Initiative), httpJ/www.acf.hhs.gov/healthymarriage/
about/mission.html.
12 See infra notes 55-144 and accompanying text.
13 This proposal differs greatly from the ALI adoption and discussion of domestic
partnership. Cf PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 30-31 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (addressing domestic partnerships
that result from non-marital cohabitation and related agreements that track marriage model).
The ALL limited its review by explaining, "This Chapter [Domestic Partners] governs financial
claims between parties to a non-marital relationship. It addresses the legal obligations that
domestic partners, as defined for purposes of this Chapter, have toward one another at the
dissolution of their relationship." Id. at 908 (emphasis added). In contrast, our proposal
explores partnership formation and ex ante decision-making, as well as dissolution.
Additionally, it allows for the intentional formation of domestic partnerships by couples who
may not necessarily share a common residence. Cf id. at 916 ("For the purposes of defining
relationships to which this Chapter applies, domestic partners are two persons of the same
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domestic partnership substitute for civil marriage and recommends
that marriage continue-absent legal significance-under the
exclusive control of religious institutions. 14 To further this
argument, Part II-Something Old, reviews traditional reasons for
marriage and explains that modem couples expect marriage to
provide something other than couples anticipated historically. 5 In
Part III-Something Blue, the Article details how modern marriage
fails to serve many families. 6 In particular, many couples, both
with and without children, cannot marry under contemporary law.
Even if couples can marry, they are often ill served by the current
Specifically, although state marriage
marital structure.
requirements are usually minimal, couples are often wholly ignorant
of what their marital rights and obligations involve. 7 Moreover,
many couples may not give serious thought to their goals and
expectations,' 8 or may fail to consider potential negative outcomes,
such as dissolution. s If dissolution does occur, couples must then
commit limited family assets to mediating or litigating the details

or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a
primary residence and a life together as a couple.").
14 Although marriage would no longer have legal significance, it might well continue to
have moral, emotional, and communicative significance.
"5See infra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 55-144 and accompanying text.
17 See The Bride to Be Channel, Marriage Law Requirements by State, http://www.
1800bride2b.com/articles/marriagelawschart.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (providing
general license requirements by state).
18 One recent high profile example of this was Britney Spears's "spur of the moment"
marriage at a chapel in Las Vegas and subsequent annulment. Britney Spears Marriage
Annulled, CNN, Jan. 5, 2004, httpJ/www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZfMusicOl/05/britney.
spears.wedding.ap/. Many couples fail to discuss critical relationship issues before marriage.
Eric V. Copage, MarriageIs Not Built On Surprises,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, § 9, at 20;
Questions Couples Should Ask (Or With They Had) Before Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2006. Eric W. Copage, On Bended Knee, With Questionnairein Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2007, § 9, at 8 (listing questions readers suggested would be spouses should ask each others).
'" See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker& Robert E. Emery, When Every RelationshipIsAboveAverage:
Perceptionsand Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage,17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993) (describing survey results in which marriage license applicants had idealistic
predictions about their own chances of getting divorced, even while accurately estimating
average divorce rates); Ying-Ching Lin & Priya Raghubir, Gender Differences in Unrealistic
Optimism About Marriage and Divorce: Are Men More Optimistic and Women More
Realistic?, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 198, 200 (2005) (reporting study showing
that both men and women are unrealistically optimistic about their chances of having a happy
marriage). We thank Dr. Mollyann Brodie of the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation for her
research assistance concerning this issue.
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of divorce. 2' To make matters worse, many divorced families face
economic hardships because of insufficient or delinquent financial
maintenance. 2 '
To address these concerns over the current state of marriage, the
remaining sections of this Article introduce the Uniform Domestic
Partnership Act. While addressing every eventuality remains
beyond the scope of this Article, these sections and appendices
provide a general overview of the proposal.2 2 Specifically, Part IV
undertakes a brief review of applicable traditional business
partnership law 23 and explains how drafters might modify business
partnership law to fit and support domestic and familial enterprises.
Part V then describes how this new law would work (1) to secure the
parentage and welfare of children (conceived of as analogous to
limited partners), (2) to create an efficient and unified domestic
economic enterprise, (3) to obtain legal rights and benefits based on
a partnership status, and (4) to reduce the financial costs and
mutual acrimony often associated with divorce. 24 APPENDIX A
presents a partnership application that could serve to guide couples
into one of four types of domestic partnership: (1) the enduring
domestic partnership, (2) the provisional domestic partnership, (3)
the filial domestic partnership, and (4) the caregiving domestic

20 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, MandatoryPlanningfor Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 418
(1992) (advocating pre- and antenuptials to reduce costs of divorce).
21 Child support law expert, Drew Swank, reported:
As of 1998, there were approximately 14 million parents in the United
States who had custody of 22.9 million children who were eligible to receive
child support. Only fifty-six percent of these custodial parents, however,
had some type of child support order or agreement. Of these, fifty-nine
percent received either none or only part of the ordered or agreed upon
amount of child support. All told, $29.1 billion in child support was owed
in 1997, but only $17.1 billion-fifty-nine percent-was paid. Thirty-two
percent of custodial parents received no child support at all in 1997. By
fiscal year 2000, the amount of child support paid dropped to fifty-six
percent of what was owed.
Drew A. Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 357,

358-59(2003). See HERBERTJACOB, SILENTREVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OFDIVORCE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 127-44 (1988) (discussing evolution of child custody in United

States).
2 We intend this Article to be the first in a series that explores the various aspects of our
Uniform Domestic Partnership Act (UDPA).
See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 279-356 and accompanying text.
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partnership."
APPENDIX B provides sample provisions of the
Uniform Domestic Partnership Act.26

II. SOMETHING OLD-MARRIAGE
And what of Marriage, master? ....
Love one another, but make not a bond of love. 7
Today in America, most couples intend their marriage to be "a
bond of love." They marry to express their love and commitment.28
This concept of companionate marriage, however, is a relatively new
phenomenon.2 9
Until the late eighteenth century, most societies around
the world saw marriage as far too vital an economic and
political institution to be left entirely to the free choice
of the two individuals involved, especially if they were
going to base their decision on something as unreasoning
and transitory as love. 0
Before the late eighteenth century, marriage typically only served
one or more of three goals: (1) to consolidate wealth and resources,
(2) to forge political alliances, and (3) to consummate peace
treaties."' Marriage also confirmed domestic roles: giving men legal
and normative authority over women and children, as well as
identifying which children could claim their parents' property.3 2

§ 2, at 213.
See infraAPPENDIX B, at 222-29. A modified version of this proposal is currently being
considered by Indiana legislators for presentation in committee.
7 Kahlil Gibran, On Marriage,in THE PROPHET 15 (1923). The passage ends, "Give your
hearts, but not into each other's keeping./For only the hand of Life can contain your
heartsJAnd stand together but not too near together'For the pillars of the temple stand
apart,/And the oak tree and the cypress grow not in each other's shadow." Id. at 16.
28 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 7 (2004)
(explaining that modern marriage "is supposed to be, above all, a matter of partnership and
love").
29 See COONTZ, supra note 1, at 5-7 (discussing evolution of love as reason for marriage).
-" Id. at 5.
25 See infra APPENDIX A,
2

3' Id. at 6.
32

Id. at 7.
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Marriage was not originally a Christian religious institution."3
During its first thousand years, the Catholic Church did not
consider marriage a sacrament and weddings were not celebrated
in churches.3 4 Only beginning in the ninth century did the Church
periodically enforce rules against incestuous marriages between
monarchs and nobles.3 5 The Church's desire to prevent the
consolidation of secular political power and wealth, rather than its
disapproval of incest, however, actually prompted this new
enforcement effort.3 6 Not until 1215 did the Fourth Lateran Council
declare that weddings had to take place in a church. 7 Common law
marriage developed from the voiced intent of individuals-typically
poor persons-to marry.3
These individuals needed neither
witnesses nor ceremony to create their unions.39
Consistent with the institution's secular roots, American law has
never recognized marriage as a religious sacrament but only as a
"civil contract."" Moreover, the colonies did not inherit into their
system of laws Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, which
formalized the requirements for a valid marriage in England and
mandated many functions typically performed by (or in) the Church
of England.4 '
During colonial times, religious leaders who

33 See WOLFSON, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that Catholic Church did not concern itself
with marriage for one thousand years).
' Id.; see also COONTZ, supra note 1, at 104 (discussing Church's lack of concern for
marriage in lower class during Middle Ages).
' Barbara Kantrowitz, Couples: State of Our Unions,NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2004, at 44,
44 (quoting Stephanie Coontz); see also COONTZ, supra note 1, at 88-103 (discussing
aristocratic marriages in medieval Europe).
' See Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 44 (discussing evolution of marriage from ninth
century).
37 See COONTZ, supra note 1, at 106-07 (stating Fourth Lateran Council's
requirements
for valid marriage). Coontz reported that until the twelfth century, the Church deemed a
marriage "valid if entered into by mutual consent and then sealed by sexual intercourse." Id.
at 106. In later years, consent became more important to the Church than consummation in
validating marriage. See NANCY F. CoTr, PUBLIC VOws: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 10-11 (2000) (discussing formation of marital union).
38 See COONTZ, supra note 1, at 104-06 (tracing marriage history of common, non-noble
people).
3 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 18 (discussing common law marriage as entered into
by agreement).
o Id. at 17-18; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.").
"' See FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 18-19 (discussing English statute barring informal
marriages).
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performed marriages, as authorized under local law, merely
witnessed the commitment and verified the satisfaction of civil
marriage license requirements.4 2 Religious leaders continue to do
the same today.4
Beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however,
the institution of marriage changed in fundamental ways. In her
recent book, Marriage,a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or
How Love Conquered Marriage,Stephanie Coontz explains:
But only in the seventeenth century did a series of
political, economic, and cultural changes in Europe begin
to erode the older functions of marriage, encouraging
individuals to choose their mates on the basis of
personal affection and allowing couples to challenge the
right of outsiders to intrude upon their lives. And not
until the late eighteenth century, and then only in
Western Europe and North America, did the notion of
free choice and marriage for love triumph as a cultural
ideal."
Coontz's study confirms that marriage was not primarily an
expression of love and commitment, as it is today, until the late
eighteenth century.4 5 Her review demonstrates that for hundreds
of years marriage served only the last three functions enumerated
in the introduction: (1) to secure the parentage and welfare of
children, (2) to create an efficient and unified domestic economic

42 See WOLFSON, supra note 10, at 5 (discounting spiritual significance of American
weddings); see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-6-1 (West 2006) (defining who is legally allowed
to solemnize marriage).
4
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-11-4-1 to -19 (West 2006) (setting forth marriage
licenses and certificates requirements for Indiana).
" COONTZ, supra note 1, at 7.
4' E.J. Graff, Senior Researcher at the Brandeis Institute for Investigative Journalism,
concluded that "traditional" marriage resulted from common financial interests. See E.J.
GRAFF, WHAT Is MARRIAGE FOR? 2 (2004) (discussing impact of money on marriage). She

found that, as the American economy changed, "modern" marriage was born. Id. at 3. By
1850, when individuals could support themselves apart from their families of origin and
marital partners, individuals focused more on "matters of the heart when choosing spouses."

Id.
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enterprise, and (3) to obtain legal rights and benefits based on
marital status.4 6
Moreover, Coontz ably shows that love conquered marriage and,
arguably, so did the church. 47 Even President Bush's official website
proclaims, "Marriage is a sacred institution, and its protection is
essential to the continued strength of our society."41 If you ask
anyone why he or she married, the spontaneous response will
probably evidence marriage's expressive function of love and
commitment-not its economic function to secure inheritance rights
for children or to obtain joint filing status for a tax return. 49 As a
2004 Newsweek survey revealed, 46%-almost half of Americans
polled-think marriage is primarily a "religious matter" rather than
a "legal matter."5 °
Given that marriage and its associated law did not originally
have the expressive and bonding function that usually motivates
modern couples, one must ask whether this civil contract can
adequately satisfy anticipated emotional and spiritual needs. Can
the law even foster emotional and religious bonds or does it simply
provide the structural framework within which bonds may grow or
wither? Some would argue that the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
endorsement of marriage because it has become primarily a
"religious matter,"5 ' and therefore its "establishment" violates the
First Amendment. Additionally, family law scholar Ira Ellman
suggests:

4See COONTZ, supra note 1, at 34-48 (discussing theories of origin for marriage).
" See id. at 5 (discussing emergence of love-based marriage).
4' Proclamation by George W. Bush, President, U.S., Marriage Protection Week, 2003
(Oct. 3, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031003-12.html.
41 See, e.g., Letter from Barry R. Bedrick to Henry J. Hyde, supra note 10, Enclosure 1,
at 3-4 (detailing numerous tax consequences associated with marriage).
'5 Karl Agne, An Analysis of Public Polling-Week Ending February 27, 2004, http://72.14.
203.104tsearch?q=cache:nns4QMf85akJ:www.democracycorps.com/weekly/PublicPollingReporLMarchl_2004.rtf+newsweek+poll+feb+20+marriage+%22legal+matter%22&hl=e
n&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=l; Brian Braiker, A Tighter Race, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4333712/.
51 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."); see, e.g., RAUCH, supra note 10, at 40-54 (arguing that modern marriage mandates
secular doctrine); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage,FullFaith and Credit and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 9, 36 (2005) (suggesting that Free Exercise
Clause may require states to permit people to marry in either religious ceremonies or in
nonreligious commitment ceremonies).
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Most of what we do for our parents, our children, our
spouses, and our siblings is not governed by law. Yet
these nonlegal obligations to our families are powerful.
We may feel they constrain us far more than do our legal
obligations. If that is the case, who needs law? What
can it add? ... The short answer is straightforward:
for families, . . we sometimes want to buttress social
norms that have become too weak to command
compliance. And so we substitute legal commands for
the faded ties of affection. Yet we surely know that law
cannot really replace affection. It can, at best, sustain
only a few of the functions normally maintained by the
intact family.5 2
Suppose that Ellman is correct: What functions of marriage can
sustain the institution if law cannot regulate affection? The answer
must be only those functions marriage served for thousands of years
before it became an expression of religious and companionate
association. Even if Ellman is wrong and the law can regulate
affection, how often does law serve as a gentle, subtle tool that
fosters warm, nurturing relationships?5" By corollary, how has the
law failed what the Bible proclaims we should "let not man put
asunder"?5 4
III. SOMETHING BLUE-PROBLEMS WITH MARRIAGE

In her historiography of marriage, Stephanie Coontz describes
how modern marriage, prompted by love and influenced by dramatic
social change, led to new issues in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. She explains:

52 Ira Ellman, Why Making Family Law Is Hard, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 699, 700 (2003).

For an interesting discussion of whether marriage affects the relationships of fathers
and their children, see Wilson, supra note 9, at 864-79 (citing Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does
MarriageMake People Good or Do Good People Marry?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889, 893-94
(2005)).
'4 Matthew 19:6.
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No sooner had the ideal of the love match and lifelong
intimacy taken hold than people began to demand the
right to divorce. No sooner did people agree that
families should serve children's needs than they began
to find the legal penalties for illegitimacy inhumane.
Some people demanded equal rights for women so they
could survive economically without having to enter
Others even argued for the
loveless marriages.
decriminalization of homosexual love, on the ground that
people should be free to follow their hearts."5
In this passage, Coontz notes several examples of how modern
marriage often fails to serve many families: unilateral divorce,
failure to accept nonmarital children, gender inequality, and the
failure to recognize homosexual love.
A. UNILATERAL DIVORCE

The demand for divorce increased in the twentieth century and
ultimately led to the elimination of fault as a prerequisite for
divorce." As Professors Eric Rasmusen and Jeffrey Stake explain,
this evolution affected the terms of dissolution as well as the
grounds for divorce. 57 As a consequence, courts awarded less
maintenance and granted women fewer privileges.58 Rasmusen and
Stake conclude:
[Tihe legal reforms radically changed the incentives
married persons confronted. With no assurance that a
marriage would continue and no security for either party
in the judicially determined terms of divorce, the parties
to a marriage remained nearly as financially insecure
after marriage as they had been when single. Spreading
55 COONTZ, supra note 1, at 8.
56 For a brief history of no-fault divorce, see CARLE. SCHNEIDER& MARGARET F. BRINIG,

AN INVITATION TO FAMmY LAW 348-49 (1995).

" Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizingthe
MarriageContract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 455-56 (1998).
6 Id. at 457.
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of financial losses within the marital unit could no
longer be relied upon when one spouse had the option to
bail out of a household in difficulty. Devoting time and
energy to producing assets useful to the marriage
became riskier. A career became a safer bet for either
party. People across the country responded to those new
incentives, spending more time at the office and less at
home.5 9
From this description of the no-fault divorce revolution, one can
anticipate several repercussions on the goals facilitated by
marriage.
First, marriage ceases to create an efficient and unified domestic
enterprise because spouses can no longer trust that their marriage
will sustain them, even if they devote significant energy to it. Each
spouse is free to take advantage of the marital investment through
a unilateral no-fault divorce. Poverty statistics reveal that divorce
correlates closely with financial crisis. In 2001, almost a quarter
(23.4%) of children and their single custodial parents lived below the
poverty level.6 ° While this percentage dropped from 33.3% in 1993,
the rate remained four times higher than that for married couples
living with related children (6. 1%).6" Moreover, these poverty rates
demonstrate gender inequality. Whereas the poverty rate for
custodial fathers was 14.7% in 2001, it was 25% for custodial
mothers.6 2
Second, if the individuals spend more time at the workplace to
insure against potential economic loss resulting from divorce, then
arguably they are not demonstrating (or at least are demonstrating
less) love and commitment to each other and the marriage.6 3 Thus,

59 Id. at 459 (footnotes omitted).
60 TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERSAND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2001, at 3 (2003), availableat http://www.

census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-225.pdf.
61 id.
62 id.
' In essence, the adjustment of time at work is a form of agency cost. The more effort
that partners expend protecting themselves, the less successful, other things being equal, the

For an example in the business partnership context, see, Nicholas
partnership.
Georgakopoulos, Meinhard v. Salmon and the EconomicsofHonor, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
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no-fault divorce and its new dissolution terms frustrate two of the
four goals of modern marriage.
This no-fault divorce system also thwarts the remaining two
marriage goals. The rise in the divorce rate that followed the advent
of no-fault divorce obviously thwarts the fourth reason for marriage,
the acquisition of legal rights and benefits. 4 Lastly, children also
suffer as a result of no-fault divorce. For years, scholars have
decried the plight of children and custodians who fall into poverty
because of the financial consequences of divorce.6 5 Children often
suffer in other ways from divorce; they may have more "behavioral,
emotional, health, and academic problems than children in intact
families."66 These problems may continue into adulthood. One
study based on a meta analysis of other studies involving more than
81,000 individuals concluded that "adults who experienced parental
divorce exhibited lower levels of well-being than did adults whose
parents were continuously married." 7 Professor Daniel Lichter, an
Ohio State sociologist, found that families headed by unwed mothers
who marry and divorce also endure higher rates of poverty than

137-64 (showing how partners ex ante would prefer broad fiduciary duties thereby reducing
cost of self-protection measures such as monitoring other partner).
'4 While divorce affects many marital benefits, it does not erase all of them. For example,
a father of a child "legitimated" by marriage can still inherit post-divorce from that child who
later dies. See, e.g., IND. CODEANN. § 31-14.7-1 (West 2006) (providing that marriage creates
presumption of paternity for child born during marriage); § 29-1-2-1 (authorizing intestate
distribution to surviving parents).
' See generally GRALL, supra note 60 (describing poverty rates of custodial parents). It
is possible that divorce does not lead to financial crisis but merely correlates with it and that
divorced parents might find themselves living below the poverty level had they never married
or had they never divorced. Given the loss of the economies of a single household, however,
we are willing to assume causation in addition to correlation.
" Donna Ruane Morrison & Andrew J. Cherlin, The Divorce Process and Young
Children's Well-Being: A ProspectiveAnalysis, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 800, 800 (1995). As
with the effect of divorce on finances, although correlation has been established, causation
is much less clear. There may also be differences for male and female children. For example,
Morrison and Cherlin found little negative effect of divorce on girls once they controlled for
prior family characteristics, but found negative effects for boys. Id.; see also Katherine Shaw
Spaht, Forthe Sake of the Children: Recapturingthe Meaning ofMarriage,73 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1547, 1552 (1997-1998) (noting that married mother and father in home result in
measurable "physical, emotional, psychological, and economic" benefits to children) (citations
omitted).
67 Paul R. Amato & Bruce Keith, ParentalDivorce andAdult Well-being: A Meta-analysis,
53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43, 43 (1991) (finding that strongest effects were in "status,
psychological adjustment, behavior/conduct, and educational attainment").
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families of unwed mothers who never married."8 Thus, marriage
that ends in divorce impacts not only spouses but entire families in
numerous ways.69
B. FAILURE TO ACCEPT NONMARITAL CHILDREN

Among other past legal injustices, the common law once deemed
a child born out of wedlock "filius nullius" (nobody's child).7" A
nonmarital child belonged to no one and could not inherit from
either her mother or father.7 The common law followed a wrathful
God, "visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children."72
Marriage protected children from suffering such a terrible legal fate.
Times have since changed in several important ways for
nonmarital children. First, on the legal front, any law that
discriminates against a nonmarital child faces heightened
(intermediate) scrutiny by federal courts. 73 The "statutory
classification must be substantially related to an important
governmental objective" to survive this review. 74 Addressing this

' Jeff Grabmeier, Government'sMarriagePromotionPoliciesLikely to FallShort Without
Emphasis on Reducing Unwed Childbearing,Study Suggests, OHIO ST. RES. NEWS, May 5,
2003, httpJ/researchnews.osu.edu/archive/promarry.htm.
69 Whether or not parents marry and divorce, the collection of child support remains a
huge problem for children and their custodians. In fiscal year 2004, parents owed $28 billion
in child support but only about $16.5 billion (59%) was collected and distributed. U.S. DEPT
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2004 PRELIMINARY

REPORT (2005), http:/www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/csepubs/2005/reports/preliminaryreport/.
Thus, obligors owed but did not pay $11.5 billion (41%). Id. Total arrearages reported for all
years amounted to $102 billion. Id.
70 Jana Singer, Marriage,Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 249 (2006).
71 RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 125 (2004); see also

Linda Kelly-Hill, Equal ProtectionMisapplied: The Politicsof Gender and Legitimacy and
the Denial ofInheritance(manuscript at nn.99-107 and accompanying text, on file with the
authors).
72 Exodus 20:5; but see Ezekiel 18:20 ("The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father,
neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall
be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.').
73 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Of course, courts using heightened scrutiny
can still validate a law that discriminates against nonmarital children. See, e.g., Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53-54 (2001) (validating deportation of nonmarital child whose father was
American citizen because of important governmental interest in facilitating identification of
parent-child relationships).
74 Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
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classification, the Supreme Court explained, "We again reject the
argument that 'persons will shun illicit relations because the
offspring may not one day reap the benefits' that would accrue to
them were they legitimate."7 5
Second, more unmarried mothers are giving birth to children
than ever before. In 2002, a record 34% of births were by unwed
women. 76 More than twice as many unmarried African American
women gave birth than married African American women did." The
percentage of births to unmarried mothers for all races has almost
doubled since 1980, when the rate was 18.4%.7' As such, the second
marital goal-the "legitimation"79 and protection of children-does
not have evidentiary support when significant numbers of people
have children outside of marriage.8 ° At least a third of child-bearing
or their sexual partners have not married despite
American women
8l
pregnancy.
C. FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE HOMOSEXUAL LOVE

Americans are finally acknowledging the reality of homosexual
love. Indeed, one need only read some of the reviews for the 2005
acclaimed movie, Brokeback Mountain, to conclude that society
finally recognizes the bonds of love found in gay and lesbian
relationships.8 2
75 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406

U.S. 164, 173 (1972)).
76

NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL NATIONAL VITAL

STATISTICS REPORT, 10 tbl. C (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/
nvsr52_10.pdf.
7
Id. at 49 tbl. 13. Sixty-eight percent of African American women giving birth were
unmarried. The percentage for whites was 28.5%. Id.
78 Id. at 10 tbl.
C.
79 While children born out of wedlock still sometimes are called "illegitimate," many
family law scholars are now referring to these children as "nonmarital." See, e.g., ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN&D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY,AND STATE 886 (2005) (indexing "illegitimate
children" as "nonmarital children").
so The figures for 2002 confirm 4,022,000 live births. Of those, 594,000, or almost 15%,
were to Black mothers. U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, STATISTCALABSTRACTOFTHE UNITED STATES:
2006, at 65 tbl. 75 (125th ed. 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/
06statab/vitstat.pdf. Approximately 1,366,000 children were born to unwed mothers in 2002.
Of these, 405,000, or almost 30%, were to Black mothers. Id. at 69 tbl. 82.
81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
82 Brokeback Mountain appeared on more critics' Top 10 lists than any other movie
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It's a deeply felt, emotional love story that deals with the
uncharted, mysterious ways of the human heart just as
so many mainstream films have before it. The two
lovers here just happen to be men.8 3
What is truly distinctive about "Brokeback Mountain" is
that it brings to life a love story that, after all these
years of love stories, is essentially new to mainstream
movies, and it does so without special pleading or
sentimentality."
While these reviews laud the artistic reach of the film, another
highlight its financial promise:
Despite the cracks about gay cowboys on late-night TV
and chin-stroking about whether it would play in Peoria,
"Brokeback Mountain" is poised to be not just one of the
most praised films of the 2005 Oscar class -- it will

released in 2005. See Metacritic.com, 2005 Critics' Picks (2005), http://www.metacritic.com/
film/awards/2005/toptens.shtml (indicating Brokeback Mountain appeared on thirty-five top
ten lists, six more than any other film).
' Kenneth Turan, The New Frontierof'Brokeback' Is Vast and Heartfelt,L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
9, 2005, part E, at 1. Another reviewer commented, "It is simply one of the greatest love
stories in film history." Joe Williams, Story ofHidden Love Reveals StellarPerformances,ST.
LOUIS POST-DIsP., Dec. 6,2005, availableat http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/entertainment/
reviews.nsi/movie/story/EC397CFCOD8B06DD862570D8006FF193?OpenDocument.
' Peter Rainer, Cowboys Saddled with a Secret, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2005,
at 11. But compare Stephen Holden, Riding the High Country, Findingand LosingLove, N.Y.
TMSs, Dec. 9, 2005, at 11, wherein Mr. Holden doubts that American culture has fully
accepted homosexual love:
"Brokeback Mountain" is not quite the period piece that some would like
to imagine. America's squeaky closet doors may have swung open far
enough for a gay rodeo circuit to flourish. But let's not kid ourselves. In
large segments of American society, especially in sports and the military,
those doors remain sealed. The murder of Matthew Shepard, after all, took
place in "Brokeback" territory. Another recent film, "Jarhead" (in which
Mr. Gyllenhaal plays a marine), suggests how any kind of male behavior
perceived as soft and feminine within certain closed male environments
triggers abuse and violence and how that repression of sexual energy is
directly channeled into warfare.
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become one of the most profitable movies of the year,
and a mainstream one at that. 5
This economic forecast suggests that even heterosexuals are willing
to pay money to consider the issue of homosexual love.
State law, driven by both courts and legislatures, also is evolving
to recognize gay and lesbian couples.8 6 In 1997, Hawaii became the
first state to extend some of the legal benefits of marriage to
"reciprocal beneficiaries," adult homosexual couples and couples who
cannot otherwise marry." Soon thereafter in 1999, the Vermont

' John Lippman, Mining 'Brokeback Mountain. To Make a Hit, Studio Wooed Women,
Weighed Venues; New York's Microclimates, WALLST.J., Jan. 27,2006, atW6. Wikipedia also
details the movie's financial success:
Brokeback Mountain's theatrical run lasted for 133 days and grossed
$83,043,761 in North America and $95,000,000 abroad, adding up to a
worldwide gross of more than $178 million. It is the top-grossing release
of Focus Features, ranks fifth among the highest-grossing westerns, and
eighth among the highest-grossing romantic dramas (1980-Present).
Brokeback Mountain,Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BrokebackMountain (footnotes
omitted) (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
8 Internationally, other countries are recognizing same-sex couples. See, e.g., Halpern
v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161, 200 (2003) (holding that marriage in Ontario must include samesex unions); Note, Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriageand Family: Inching
Down the Aisle: Differing PathsToward the Legalizationof Same-Sex Marriagein the United
States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2004-05 (2003) (noting that although in 1989 no
countries recognized same-sex marriage, in 2001 and 2003 respectively the Netherlands and
Belgium approved same-sex marriage, and that other Western European countries have
granted "same-sex couples many of the same rights that opposite-sex couples enjoy through
traditional marriage"); Anjuli Willis McReynolds, Comment, What InternationalExperience
Can Tell U.S. CourtsAbout Same-sex Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1092-1102 (2006)
(surveying same-sex marriage in other countries).
8'See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (LexisNexis 2005) (explaining purpose of reciprocal
beneficiaries chapter). Hawaii defined eligible parties by explaining:
In order to enter into a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship, it shall be
necessary that:
(1) Each of the parties be at least eighteen years old;
(2) Neither of the parties be married nor a party to another reciprocal
beneficiary relationship;
(3) The parties be legally prohibited from marrying one another under
chapter 572;
(4) Consent of either party to the reciprocal beneficiary relationship has not
been obtained by force, duress, or fraud; and
(5) Each of the parties sign a declaration of reciprocal beneficiary
relationship as provided in section 572C-5.
Id. § 572C-4.
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Supreme Court held in Baker v. Vermont"8 that the state's ban on
same-sex marriage denied homosexual couples the benefits and
protections afforded heterosexual married persons, in violation of
the Vermont Constitution. 9 The Vermont legislature responded by
enacting a civil union statute for gay and lesbian couples that
confers all the benefits and protections of Vermont marriage to
those who form civil unions.9" In Goodridge v. Departmentof Public
Health,s" the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts opined that
the state must open marriage to eligible gay and lesbian couples; a
civil union statute would not suffice in Massachusetts.9 2
Most recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court took a stance
similar to Vermont's approach to marital rights.9 3 It held that the
legislature must amend the New Jersey marriage statutes or enact
other legislation to give committed same-sex couples the same rights
and benefits afforded opposite-sex couples.94 New Jersey already
has a domestic partnership statute that grants same-sex couples
some rights and benefits. 95 This statute does not provide identical
rights, however. Under Lewis, the legislature had 180 days to
fashion a completely congruent scheme for same-sex couples.9 On
December 21, 2006, New Jersey adopted a civil union statute that
affords same-sex couples all the rights and responsibilities of
marriage but not the title.9 7
Several other states have legislatively enacted statutes that
grant marriage-like benefits to some couples. Connecticut has a
civil union statute.9 California provides for domestic partnership
and associated marriage-like benefits. 99 To date, Massachusetts

8 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
89 Id. at 886. At issue was the Common Benefits Clause. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
90 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002).
91 798 N.E.2d 941,968 (Mass. 2003) (holding state had failed to articulate rational reason
for banning same-sex marriage in violation of Massachusetts Constitution).
92In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004).
93 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (2006).
' Id. (citing to Connecticut and Vermont civil union statutes).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-1 (West Supp. 2006).
Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224.
97 Gay Civil Unions Legalized in New Jersey, CBS NEwS, Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/21/politics/main2289236.shtml.
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38aa (West Supp. 2006).
9 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004) (effective Jan. 1, 2005).
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remains the only state that will marry same-sex couples. In
response, many states have amended their state constitutions to ban
the recognition of same-sex marriages, including those performed in
Massachusetts. 100
Ironically, as views have polarized over the question of whether
gays and lesbians should be able to use the word "marriage" to
describe their relationships, the once radical demand for same-sex
civil unions has become a compromise position. Most recent opinion
polls show a clear majority in favor of legal recognition of such civil
unions, if not support for same-sex "marriage."101 One businessman
told Coontz, " 'Let them have the same rights as me and my
wife ..... 'Just don't call it marriage.' "102

100 In 2004, thirteen states amended their constitutions to limit marriage and its
associated benefits to opposite-sex couples. NATL CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, MARRIAGE,
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION
FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (2005), http'/www.nclrights.org/
publications/pubs/marriage-equality09O5.pdf (discussing Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Utah).
On November 8, 2006, seven more states voted to amend their constitutions to ban
same-sex marriage. Elizabeth Mehren, What to Make of the Marriage Votes?, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 9,2006 (discussing Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia,
and Wisconsin), available at 2006 WLNR 19425051. Only Arizona defeated such a proposed
amendment. Id. See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating
DangerousConstitutionalStraits: A Prolegomenonon the FederalMarriageAmendment and
the Disenfranchisement of Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 599, 639-40 (2005)
(reviewing federal constitutional amendment proposals and suggesting that Defense Of
Marriage Act (DOMA)-type amendment might result in "the end of state-sanctioned
marriage").
101 For example, a Pew Research Center survey conducted in July 2005 found that while
a majority opposed "allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally," only 42% opposed "allowing
gay and lesbian couples to enter into legal agreements with each other that would give them
many of the same rights as married couples." PollingReport.com, Law and Civil Rights,
http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Feb. 15,2007). Similar results were found
in surveys conducted in 2005 for the Boston Globe, ABC News/Washington Post, CNN/USA
Today, and CBS News/New York Times. Id. For a recent in-depth compilation of public
opinion polls regarding attitudes towards same-sex couples and homosexuality, including
historical trends, see generally Karlyn H. Bowman, Am. Enter. Inst., Attitudes About
Homosexualityand GayMarriage,http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050520_HOMOSEXUALITY
0520.pdf.
102 COONTZ, supra note 1, at 275.
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D. GENDER INEQUALITY

Wives should be subordinate to their husbands as to the
Lord. For the husband is head of his wife just as Christ
is head of the church, he himself the savior of the body.
As the church is subordinate to Christ, so wives should
be subordinate to their husbands in everything. °3
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in
law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband:
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything;... and her condition during her marriage is
called her coverture.'0
Once, marriage meant the obliteration of a woman's legal
identity. The doctrine of coverture described the collapse of the
wife's legal status into that of her husband upon marriage.' For
all practical purposes, married women lost control of any property
they owned or acquired.' ° The only benefit (for children) under that
system was that husbands were financially responsible for any of
their wives' "debts," including among these "debts," stepchildren.'07
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the passage of women's
property acts began to restore the legal status of married women.'08
It was not until after 1971, however, that the Supreme Court
103Ephesians 5:22-24.
104 1

WnILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1897). The

"feme covert" described the married woman whose identity was "covered" by that of her
husband. COONTZ, supra note 1, at 115. The doctrine of coverture served as the basis of
American domestic-relations law until the passage of the married women property acts
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Id. at 186.
105 COONTZ, supra note 1, at 186. In the thirteenth century, Henry de Bracton described
a married couple as one person-the husband. Id.
10 But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 197 n.65 (explaining that expensive legal
maneuvering might ease or avoid restrictions of coverture).
1o7MNOOKUN & WEISBERG, supra note 79, at 145.
108 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORYOFAMERICANLAW 208-11(1985). Mississippi was
the first to pass such a law in 1839. ROGERS M. SMITH, Civc IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 233 (1997).
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consistently interpreted the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
to protect women. 09s Moreover, many states did not repeal or
overturn vestiges of sexist marital roles and marital disabilities
until very recently. For example, New York retained a marital rape
exemption until 1984.110
Marriage continues to invoke the memory and sometimes the
reality"' of the subordinated role of women. For example, the
website family.org, which the conservative group Focus on the
Family sponsors, explicitly addresses marital roles:
When it comes to marriage, women typically find
themselves playing three roles - wife, mother and
worker (either in the home, office or both). Men,
meanwhile, are expected to be the primary family
provider, protector and spiritual leader. These roles
may have become blurred in the age of feminism and
liberation, yet we've found that traditional distinctions
between men and women are still essential. Recognizing
109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...

deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14-15
(1975) (invalidating Utah statute that created different ages of majority for males and
females); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding that Idaho statute violated Equal
Protection Clause because it arbitrarily favored men over women to serve as administrators
of estates).
"o People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984); WOLFSON, supra note 10, at 64. In the
seventeenth century, Lord Hale said, "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 1 SIR MATTHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736).
. The Book of Common Prayer (1789) provided that the wife should obey her husband.
I N. take thee M. to my wedded husband, to have and to hold, from this day
forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in
health, to love, cherish, and obey, till death us do part, according to God's
holy ordinance; and thereto I give thee my troth.
THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 255 (1789), available at
httpJ/justus.anglican.org/resources/bcp/1789/Marriage-1789.htm. The 1979 version omits the
wife's vow to obey. THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 427 (1979), available
at http://holycross-raleigh.org/bcp/427.html. See generally William McGarvey, D.D., An
Historical Account of the American Book of Common Prayer, http://justus.anglican.org/
resources/bcplmcgarveyl.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (describing history of the American
Book of Common Prayer). Some modern marriage vows retain the promise to obey, however.
See bible.org, Sample Wedding Vows, http://www.bible.org/page.asp?pageid=2436 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007) (providing four samples in which the bride vows to obey her husband
but in which the husband does not similarly promise to obey his wife).
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these respective roles is vital not only for a proper
understanding of God's design for human life, but also
12
for the survival of the family and of society as a whole.1
Focus on the Family emphasizes distinct roles for husbands and
wives in order to make clear that biological differences matter in
marriage. 113 In fact, according to Focus on the Family, sex roles
matter so much that their suppression endangers the survival of the
114
family and society as a whole!
A debate rages over whether modern companionate marriage can
survive contemporary work towards gender equality. Advocates for
traditional marriage, including Focus on the Family's founder, Dr.
James Dobson, insist that gender differences do not mean that one
sex is superior to the other."'
They suggest, instead, that
biologically determined sex differences complement each other.
When society recognizes and adheres to these sex differences,
marriage as an institution grows stronger.
In contrast, some postmodern feminists such as Jessica Knouse
might characterize the genetic traits to which Focus on the Family
refers as gender stereotypes. Knouse argues:
Although sex stereotypes have been almost entirely
eradicated from the legal definition of marriage... they
112 Focus on the Family, Roles in Marriage, http://www.family.org/married/topics
a0025090.cfin (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
113 In discussing genetic differences, Dr. Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, explains:

He likes excitement, change, challenge, uncertainty and the potential for
huge returns on a risky investment. She likes predictability, continuity,
safety, roots, relationships and a smaller return on a more secure
investment. These contrasting inclinations work to a couple's best
advantage. She tempers his impulsive, foolish tendencies, and he nudges
her out of apathy and excessive caution. ... Related to this is a woman's
emotional investment in her home, which usually exceeds that of her
husband. She typically cares more than he about the details of the house,
family functioning and such concerns.
Focus on the Family, Answer: How Do Men and Women Differ Emotionally?, http://familytopics.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/family-opics.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p-faqid=1085
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
14 See Focus on the Family, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
15 Dobson stated, "It is clear from even this cursory examination, however, that God made
two sexes, not one, and he designed them to fit together hand in glove. Neither is superior
to the other, but each is certainly unique." Focus on the Family, supra note 112.
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remain strong within the cultural definition of marriage.
Therefore, although conformity is no longer legally
mandated, it may still be culturally required. I propose
that the persistence of sex stereotypes in society is
largely facilitated by the continued existence of the legal
institution of marriage. As postmodern theory dictates,
a word "cannot . . . be reconceptualized outside the
bounds of its historical determinants."
Thus,
"marriage-the predominant institution through which
conformity with sex stereotypes has been legally
mandated-cannot be culturally disassociated from
historical sex stereotypes.
Redefinition is
impossible..... In order to eradicate the stereotypes,
the legal institution of marriage must be abolished." 6
Relying on the work of Martha Fineman, Knouse imagines a "desexualized regime" in which the state might recognize different
types of relationships, including "an adult taking care of an elderly
parent, a sister and brother, or two friends."" 7 But Knouse proffers
no specific plan for implementing these new legal categories.
What result from this debate? If Knouse is correct, Americans
would benefit from a new system of private domestic ordering. Even
if Dobson and Focus on the Family are correct about gender
differences, female emotional investment in the home and marriage
is still a poor financial strategy given U.S. divorce and poverty
statistics."' If Focus on the Family wants to protect women who

116

Jessica Knouse, UsingPostmodernFeministLegal Theory to Interruptthe Reinscription

of Sex Stereotypes Through the Institution of Marriage, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 159,
172-74 (2005). Arguably, George W. Bush agrees that marriage cannot be redefined
successfully. He stated, "[Miarriage cannot be severed from its cultural, religious, and
natural roots without weakening the good influence of society." Mike Allen & Alan
Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay Marriage,WASH. POST,Feb. 25, 2004, at
A1.117
Knouse, supra note 116, at 175 (citing MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 143-76 (Routledge
1995) and Michael Bronski, Why Do Gays Want to Say 'I Do?": Fightingfor MarriageIs Like
FightingOver Yesterday's Leftovers, Z MAG., Oct. 2003, at 55, 58).
"" For example, custodial mothers (31%) were twice as likely as custodial fathers (14.9%)
to receive some form of public assistance. GRALL, supra note 60, at 1. While it is possible
that women were twice as likely to seek aid, one could also conclude that they were poorer.
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prefer "a smaller return on a more secure investment," then perhaps
it might agree to reserve marriage for God and his or her faithful
and promote civil domestic partnership for women and men who
prefer "excitement, change, challenge, uncertainty and the potential
for huge returns on a risky investment."'1 9
E. THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE-PERSONALIZED

If one is still unconvinced that civil marriage is obsolete, then
consider a few more problematic examples of the institutional
failure of marriage. Suppose that best friends, Alice and Betty, lose
their husbands during the war in Iraq. Each is a single woman, and
neither can afford to rear her children on survivor benefits. They
realize that if they could "marry" and one brought in a salary while
the other cared for the children in a communal home, they could
make ends meet by taking advantage of tax and other "marital"
benefits. They cannot marry, however, because they are the same
sex and cannot even form a civil union in a state like Vermont
because they are not homosexual. 2 °
Suppose again that a priest, Colin, who is sworn to celibacy,
wants to support his live-in housekeeper, Dolores, who has devoted
herself to the rectory and his service for many years. He figures
that if they could "marry," Dolores would at least receive his Social
Security survivor benefits when he died. 2 ' They cannot marry,
however, because he would lose his parish and they might both find
themselves homeless. Of course one might argue that the Church,

119 Focus

on the Family, supra note 113.

'" See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2001) (requiring individuals be same sex to form a

civil union); see also supra notes 103-19 and accompanying text. While the Vermont civil
union statute does not explicitly require that the individuals be homosexual, the legislative
findings make clear that the legislature contemplated homosexual, same-sex couples. Gen.
Assemb. of Vt., H. 847, Act. No. 91 Sec. 1 (2000), httpJ/www.leg.state.vt.usdocs2000/acts/
ACT091.HTM. They are replete with references to gays and lesbians and, by implication,
homosexual couples. See, e.g., Legislative Finding 9 ("Despite longstanding social and
economic discrimination, many gay and lesbian Vermonters have formed lasting, committed,
caring and faithful relationships with persons of their same sex. These couples live together,
participate in their communities together, and some raise children and care for family
members together, just as do couples who are married under Vermont law.").
121 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SuRVivoRs BENEPITS (2006) http//www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/
10084.pdf.
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not the law, prevents these two from marrying. But Colin is a priest
because of a deeply felt avocation; he would deny his identity even
to consider marrying Dolores. Given his religious convictions, it
would be a sham for him to marry Delores. Indeed, it might
resemble the marriage of a gay man to a woman.'2 2 Our culture
does not value the Church-family that Colin and Dolores have
created for themselves and for the service of the greater community.
If society acknowledged and supported their nonsexual family, one
could imagine that Colin and Dolores might even adopt hard-toplace children.
Now consider Eric and Frank, a couple who have been together
fifteen years and who would like to have children. They live and
marry in Massachusetts. Suppose further that Frank's sister, Gina,
agrees to serve as a surrogate, donating an egg to be fertilized by
Eric's sperm, so that Eric and Frank can have children who are
biologically related to both of them. Frank stays home to care for
their infant twins, Hank and Isabella. What happens when Eric's
employer transfers him to its central office in Ohio? Ohio will not
recognize their marriage. 2 ' Hank and Isabella might lose a
father 2 4 because Frank never formally adopted the children. He did
not have to adopt them in Massachusetts since he was married to
Eric, agreed to. the assisted reproduction, and was listed on the
children's birth certificates. 2 ' It is not clear whether Eric and
Frank need (or can) do anything to ensure that their children retain
both legal parents no matter where the family resides.
122 "Mixed-orientation marriages" is a term used to describe a marriage of a heterosexual

and homosexual. Katy Butler, Many Couples Must Negotiate Terms of "Brokeback"
Marriages,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at F5 (citing EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF SExuALITY (1990)). Some estimate that between 2% and 4% of ever-married
American women have been or are in such marriages. Id.
'23 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(1) (West 2005) (establishing "strong public
policy" against recognition of same-sex marriages). Ohio law not only bans same-sex
marriage but also prohibits the provision of state benefits to same or opposite sex domestic
partners. Id. at (C)(3); see also James Dao, Ohio Legislature Passes Ban on Same-Sex
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A6, http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/
chronicle/archive2004/02/04/MNGFU4OFIS1.DTL.
124 Assume that Gina was only a surrogate and egg donor and was not listed on the final
birth certificates.
'2
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 1 (West 2006) ("If the petitioner has a husband
or wife living, competent to join in the petition, such husband or wife shall join therein, and
upon adoption the child shall in law be the child of both.").
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This example and the two before it demonstrate that marriage
law fundamentally fails to provide for alternative families. 126 This
legal failure affects a large number of families. The 2000 Census
revealed that only 23.5% of households consist of married adults
living with their own children. 12' Thus, more than three quarters of
our nation's households are not so-called "traditional" families.
In addition to encouraging ex ante family planning and
negotiation, the goal of our Uniform Domestic Partnership Act is to
promote and support a variety of familial groups. In particular, the
Act is designed to promote families that care for children and the
elderly; nurture people who might otherwise live outside of so-called
"traditional" families; keep children, parents, and other adults off
public assistance; and model family values of love, responsibility,
and mutual support. Instead of strengthening families, current
American laws discriminate against many who form loving, secure
families, even without legal recognition and benefits.
Review another case. Suppose that Jos6 and Kathy marry and
hope to conceive a child, as well as care for Jos's three children by
a prior marriage. Unbeknownst to them, state law permits the state
to consider Kathy's earnings and assets when setting child support
for Jos6's children, 12 support that will allow his ex-wife to remain
in graduate school indefinitely, or until the children are
emancipated. As a result, Kathy and Jos6 find that they can barely
pay the heating bill on their larger home, let alone afford another
child. If Kathy and Jos6 divorce, a court will probably lower his
child support obligation. Ironically, Kathy and Jos6 could then
afford another child. In this slightly perverse situation, divorce law
might actually motivate a couple to conceive a child out of wedlock.

126 At least one prominent commentator has argued that even polygamy 'isn't necessarily

worse than the current American alternative." John Tierney, Who's Afraid of Polygamy?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A14, availableat http'//select.nytimes.com/2006/03/lI/opinion/
lltierney.html.
127

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1 tbl.

DP-1 (2001), http'//www2.census.gov/census-2000/datasets/demographic-profile/0_United_
States/2kh00.pdf.
'28 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.053 (West 1990) (requiring stepparent to be responsible
for expenses of stepchild). A 2002 survey by John Mayoue revealed that sixteen states had
stepparent support statutes. John C. Mayoue, Stepping In to Parent,25 FAM. ADvoC. 36, 42
(2002).
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Let us stay with Kathy and Jos6 for a moment. Further assume
that they do not have another child but that Kathy takes an active
role parenting Josd's children. They move with the children to a
state that does not regulate stepparents vis-&-vis their
stepchildren.' 2 9 Eight years later, Kathy and Jos6 divorce. Can
Kathy be obligated to pay child support? Can Kathy obtain
visitation rights? What if the children want to continue seeing her?
The answers to these questions are generally "no," and "too bad," so
long as Kathy has not formally adopted the children. She could not
have adopted them, however, unless the biological mother had died
or terminated her parental rights,13 ° or a court had terminated those
rights.' 3 ' Absent adoption, Kathy has no right to maintain a legal
relationship with Jos6's children post-divorce.
Finally, take the case of Lisa and Mike. They marry and, after
the birth of their daughter, divorce. Lisa is appalled to learn that
her state will not require Mike, a partner in a prestigious law firm,
to pay their daughter's college expenses.' 3 2 Had Lisa known of this
eventuality before they married, or more importantly had she
known that Mike might be unwilling to contribute, she might have
insisted on a prenuptial agreement that would have provided for
any child's post-secondary education in case of divorce. For Lisa and
Mike's daughter, the law failed to accomplish what the couple might
have chosen ex ante had they anticipated and negotiated this issue.
Lisa's case also raises another important flaw with modern
marriage. Although propertied couples often carefully negotiated
the terms of premarital agreements centuries ago,' 3 3 modern couples
" See generally Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking StepparentRights: Has the
ALl Found a Better Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227 (2002) (concluding that most stepparents
have no duty to support their children before or after divorce from custodial parent); Mary
Ann Mason, The Modern American Stepfamily: Problems and Possibilities, in ALL OUR
FAMILIES (Mary Ann Mason et al. eds. 1998).
130 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-1-1 (West 2006) (providing for voluntary termination
of parental rights by parent).
131 See, e.g., IND. CODEANN. § 31-35-2-3 (West 2006) (providing for termination
of parental
rights by probate court).
132 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (Vernon 2002) (listing conditions for court
ordered parental child support).
133 See, e.g., Jennifer Drobac, The "Perfect"Jointure: Its FormulationAfter the Statute
of
Uses, 19 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 26, 26 (1988) (discussing creation of jointures between husband
and wife). Civil marriage, with its legal significance, historically best served those persons
who negotiated the economic and legal consequences of their alliance. Typically, parents and
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rarely do. 134 Even if couples educate themselves regarding their
state law-an unlikely prospect-they may find their effort
worthless if they move and then divorce in another state. In the
case of Eric and Frank above, they need not even divorce. The new
home state may have very different provisions than the original
state where the marriage occurred. The lack of national uniformity
regarding domestic relations law introduces a frustrating element
in our very mobile society. Thus, Lisa and Mike might decide in
Indiana that they do not need a prenuptial contract to provide for
have children
their children's college expenses. 135 By the time they
136
one.
need
will
they
however,
Texas,
and divorce in
Because many couples do not negotiate ex ante how their lives
will change if they divorce, they unwittingly accept the defaults of
divorce law and future discretionary judgments from the bench. For
example, even though the tender years presumption that directed
custody of young children to women was found unconstitutional
years ago, 37 the vast majority of women still receive primary
custody of children upon divorce. 138 The majority of men who want
custody of their children are usually out of luck. 39 In 1990, for

other community members, such as guild leaders, managed those negotiations. FRIEDMAN,
supranote 28, at 6. "Marriage was once a matter for the kinfolk to decide, not the woman and
the man." Id. "Marriage had so many economic and social ramifications for all social classes
that people generally believed it would be foolish to make such a momentous decision entirely
on their own." COONTZ, supra note 1, at 117.
" A 2002 survey by Lawyers.com found that only 1% of married or affianced Americans
had entered into prenuptial agreements.
Lawyers.com, A Study About Prenuptial
Agreements, http://family-law.lawyers.com/A_- StudyAboutPrenuptualAgreements.html.
Another study suggests that between 5-10% of those marrying have such agreements. Beth
Potier, ForMany, PrenupsSeem to PredictDoom, HARV. GAZETTE, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.
news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/10.16/01-prenup.html.
135 See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-2 (West 2006) (providing for payment of post majority
educational expenses in some cases).
136 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., ExparteDevine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695-96 (Ala. 1981) (holding that tender years
presumption represents unconstitutional gender-based classification).
1" See, e.g., GRALL, supra note 60, at 1 (reporting that Census Bureau found that 84.4%
of custodial parents were mothers while only 15.6% were fathers).
139 According to one study, 32% of fathers wanted sole custody and another 35% wanted
joint custody of their children. Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood:
EncouragingDivorced Fathersto Parent,153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 974 (2005) (citing ELEANOR
E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOcIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 99-100 (1992)). In some cases, these men did not even ask for custody. Id. at 974
(citing Leslie A. Cadwell, Note, Gender Bias Against Fathers in Custody? The Important
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example, only 9% of fathers received sole custody and only 16%
received joint custody."
Presumably, more dads would opt in
advance to retain custody of their children in the event of divorce.
And even though a prenuptial agreement regarding custody of
children is not binding upon a court in any jurisdiction,"' certainly
courts should at least consider the preference of the parties
expressed in an ex ante agreement as they contemplate their
partnership." 2 No state currently requires, as a prerequisite to
marriage, a plan for the division of assets, let alone a custody
preference declaration." 3
As the above discussion patently demonstrates, marriage fails
many families. In hope of a remedy, this Article offers a legal
substitute that could serve domestic partners just as the Uniform
Partnership Act has served business partners in this country for
many years. 144

Difference Between Outcome and Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 215, 244-45 (1993)).
140

SALLY C. CLARKE, NATL CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS

REPORT: ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1989 AND 1990, at 5 (1995), http:Hl
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/supp/mv43_,.09s.pdf.
"' See, e.g., In re Marriage of Singleteary, 687 N.E.2d 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
that court was not bound by parties' agreement regarding child support); see also UNIF.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 573 (Supp. 2006) (listing factors that court
might consider when awarding child support and not referencing prior agreement by parties).
142 Cf Guzman v. Guzman, 854 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that "[plarties
to a dissolution proceeding may enter into a binding contractual agreement for support
payments that are not required by law'); Obermiller v. Obermiller, 795 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (finding that stipulations in separation agreement as to custody, visitation, and
support are only advisory and are not binding on the court).
143 See The Bride to Be Channel, supra note 17 (listing marriage requirements and making
no mention of plan for division of assets or custody preference declaration). Professor Mary
Ann Mason argues that custodial parents should be permitted to assign to a stepparent the
authority to make decisions, for example, concerning a child's medical treatment and
education. She suggested that "[alnother alternative would allow a parent to designate that
a stepparent has the authority in these situations, perhaps through the use of a standardized
'stepparent authority form at the time of marriage or later, as the family desires." Mason &
Zayac, supra note 129, at 245.
'" See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing partnership law generally).
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SOMETHING BORROWED-PARTNERSHIP LAW

A. THE SEARCH FOR A NEW MODEL

As noted previously, several states are experimenting with novel
legal forms for domestic unions. 14
The problem with these
experiments is that they segregate homosexual couples from
heterosexual ones and create parallel but unequal systems.'46
Moreover, these new forms fail to provide for all of the families that
we envision serving. Finally, legislatures have stretched the
marriage model without providing a coherent national law to order
the functioning of these new families as they move across state
borders.'4 7
Business partnership law provides fertile ground for innovation
in the domestic sphere. 14 Judge Cardozo could almost have been
thinking of a married couple when he wrote in the seminal
partnership case, Meinhard v. Salmon, "[flor each [partner], the
venture had its phases of fair weather and of foul. The two were in
supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 10, at 129 (highlighting why civil unions are separate
from and unequal to marriage). Massachusetts is the only state that does not segregate
145 See

146 See,

homosexual couples. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

"4 The only relevant federal law permits states to ignore other states' acts and judicial
proceedings "respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other state .... " 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000). Ohio amended
its constitution, in part, to prevent the recognition of same sex unions formed in other states.
See Ohio Const. art. XV § 11 (directing state officials not to recognize "a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate... marriage").
148 See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text. Of course, others have similarly drawn
parallels between some aspects of business partnership and marriage. See, e.g., Mary Anne
Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1777-78 (2005) (analogizing
between marriage licenses and corporate charters and offering the utility of noncorporate
forms such as partnership); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage As a Trade: Bridging the
Private/PrivateDistinction, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 84 (2001) (exploring how close
corporations, limited liability companies and business partnerships resemble marriage,
polyamory and cohabitation); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership,
and Divore Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1535-38 (2005) (applying Revised Uniform
Partnership Act partnership principles to issues of marriage and parenting); Cynthia Starnes,
Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and DisassociationUnderNo-Fault,60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67, 120-30 (1993) (advocating
reform of divorce laws based on Revised Uniform Partnership Act); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 161 (1998) ("The distribution of property upon
the termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution

of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.").
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it jointly, for better or worse." 4 9 Other courts have made express
comparisons, such as in Haggett v. Hurley: "Partnership is often
called a contract, as marriage is often spoken of as a contract; but
it is rather a relation, a status, somewhat as marriage is a relation
or status."'
Business partnership law is analogous enough to
marriage that it offers some conceptual continuity. Looking to
partnership law also helps to jettison the subordination baggage of
marriage and to incorporate the fiduciary and other attractive
aspects of partnership law discussed in this Part.
One characteristic that both marriage and business partnership
share is the dual nature of the role of the partners. This Article
interprets the partner/spouse roles using contractarian and status
perspectives. American jurists have long referred to marriage as a
"civil contract." 5 ' Partnership similarly has a long history as a
contractual relationship.'5 2 Unlike other forms of contract, however,
marriage provides personal definition and identity-both for the
spouses as well as for third parties. Thus, marriage is also a
status. 5 ' Similarly, the roles and duties of business partners are
not only fixed by the contract, but also by their status as partners.'
Lawrence M. Friedman explains the evolution of family law in
these terms:
Family law has indeed moved from status to
contract-in the sense, as Milton Regan has put it, first,
that the "law is more willing to enforce agreements that
tailor family life to individual preference"; and second,
149 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
150 Haggett v. Hurley, 40 A. 561, 563

546 (1928).
(Me. 1898) (comparing "marriage partners" and

business partners).
151Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888) ("[Marriage is often termed by text
writers and in decisions of courts a civil contract."); FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 17; see also
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 62:26 n.75
(2005) (citing cases that analogize marriage to partnership agreement).
152 See, e.g., Ward v. Thompson, 63 U.S. 330, 333 (1859) (referring to 'contract
of

partnership").
" FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 18; see also Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210-11 (noting that
marriage is "something more than a mere contract"); WILLISTON & LORD, supra note
151, § 62:26 n.81 (citing courts that have viewed marriage "as hybrid in nature, being both
a contract as well as a status").
" See, e.g., Malvern Nat'l Bank v. Halliday, 192 N.W. 843, 846 (Iowa 1923) (observing
that although partnership has its origin in contract, it creates status).
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that "the law is more solicitous in general of individual
choices in family matters. " ' 55
In keeping with this trend, our proposal, detailed below in Part V,
allows participants in domestic partnerships to identify easily an
agreement that most suits them. The participants' status is that of
domestic partners. This status is not rigidly determinative of their
respective rights and obligations, however, because we propose
several forms of domestic partnership rather than just the
traditional husband and wife model. Moreover, partners can
negotiate in advance for terms that suit their respective and
communal needs.
Business partners once crafted their relationships using only
state general partnership laws. Now they can choose to form
limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, or limited
liability limited partnerships. 5 6 States have developed different
standard forms of business partnerships to meet different parties'
needs. Likewise, in the domestic sphere, marriage alone is no
longer adequate. Under our proposal, domestic partners make
explicit ex ante choices and select rights and obligations determined
by contract, based on and aided by the applicable standard forms.
If family is moving from status to contract, as have business
partnerships, why not simply adopt a strict contract model for
domestic partnership? Why not design a HAVE IT YOUR WAY@
system of domestic ordering? 5 7 The problems already noted with

"'

FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 6.

In the business context, parties could also abandon the partnership form completely
and instead form a corporation or limited liability company. There are in fact many more
potential forms for business associations, particularly when one considers the varying rules
in each of the fifty states and the association's chosen tax status. See, e.g., Robert W.
Hamilton, Entity Proliferation,37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 859, 860 (2004) (noting that number
of available business forms, "while not infinite, would certainly be very large"); William H.
Clark, Jr., What the Business World Is Looking for in an OrganizationalForm: The
Pennsylvania Experience, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 149, 150-51 (1997) (noting that
Pennsylvania had only five basic business forms in 1980 but ten forms by 1997). In addition
to these ten forms, the limited liability company might be added to this list. See, e.g., Limited
Liability Company Law of 1994, 15 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 8901-8998 (2001) (discussing limited
liability company as business form).
117 HAVE IT YOUR WAY is a registered trademark of Burger King Brands, Inc. (U.S. only)
and Burger King Corp. (outside U.S.). Burger King, http://www.bk.com/#menu=6,-1.-1 (last
visited Oct. 23, 2006).
"s
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marriage law... reflect, in part, the predominance of individual
choices and the neglect of the economic, emotional, and security
needs of some of the less powerful or subordinate family members,
generally children and spouses without paid employment.
Martha Fineman argues that caretaking is the most important
function assumed by modern families and the one that deserves
state recognition and subsidy.5 9 We agree. She suggests abolishing
marriage in favor of a system in which adult sexual affiliates would
negotiate their relationship using contract law. 6 0 This proposal has
appeal because it acknowledges the need for front-end negotiations
and investment to secure favorable contract terms' 6 '-a function
once performed in the marriage model by parents and kin.
By compelling those people who want to enter into domestic
partnerships to consider and reach agreement ex ante regarding
their views on having and raising children, the state might reduce
the likelihood of unwanted (or less wanted) children. Similarly, by
compelling people ex ante to consider and agree to terms regarding
the possible dissolution of their partnership, the state could reduce
the acrimony and the expense associated with such a termination.'6 2
One might also hope that the ex ante consideration of the nature
and form of the partnership relation would reduce the likelihood of
both dissolution and unhappy partnerships.

158

See supra notes 55-144 and accompanying text.
Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families, (Mar. 14, 2003)

159 Videotape:

(showing Martha Albertson Fineman presenting her paper, The Meaning of Marriage, at
Panel on "Intimate Affiliation and Democracy: Beyond Democracy?") (on file with Hofstra
Law Review); see also McClain, supra note 2, at 413 (noting Fineman's contention that caring
for dependent family members is most important contemporary functioning of families).
" Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?,9 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 239, 261 (2001);
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS:
QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 29, 43, 57 (Anita Bernstein ed. 2006).
161 The marriage of Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell in 1855 is an early example of frontend negotiations. Before their wedding, they agreed that a panel of arbitrators would decide
questions such as child custody if they were to separate. The arbitrators would treat the
parties as equals, instead of subordinating the wife under then existing laws. See E. Gary
Contracting for Child Custody
Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State":
Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1140-42
(2000) (suggesting use of arbitration to avoid subordinative law).
162 See generally Jeffrey Evans Stake, MandatoryPlanningfor Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV.
397 (1992) (arguing in favor of requiring couples to determine ex ante the economic
consequences of their divorce).
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Granted, requiring potential domestic partners to reach
agreement before the state will permit them to become domestic
partners imposes transaction costs on the potential domestic
partners. They must devote time and limited cognitive resources to
the endeavor and the contractual process may force them to discuss
areas of disagreement that they would rather keep
concealed.'6 3 But
16 4
costs.
these
minimize
several factors justify or
First, the considerable benefits achieved outweigh the costs.
These benefits include fuller disclosure, advanced planning, and
deliberation concerning the consequences of dissolution.'6 5 Some
states agree and have imposed analogous transaction costs on
potential spouses before marriage. For example, in an attempt to
strengthen marriage and reduce divorce rates, Minnesota offers a
discount on the marriage license fee to couples who undergo
counseling.'6 6 As part of its state-recognized covenant marriage,
Louisiana requires premarital counseling. 6 v To the degree that

1

Penalty default rules serve to compel contracting parties to disclose information. See

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
16 Although legal scholars have tended to favor minimizing transaction costs, see David
M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functionsof TransactionCosts: Rethinking Transaction
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction,47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61,68-84 (2005), they "should take
the benefits that transaction costs purchase into account." Id. at 103. See also Douglas W.
Allen, An Inquiry into the State's Role in Marriage, 13 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 171, 177-79
(1990) (suggesting that state's role in regulating marriage is to reduce couples' transaction
costs).
" Sunstein and Thaler argue that "it is both possible and desirable for . .. public
institutions to influence behavior while also respecting freedom of choice." Cass R. Sunstein
& Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismis Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159,
1159(2003). A policy is paternalistic "if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties
in a way that will make choosers better off," id. at 1162, and one way to influence choices is
to set the welfare maximizing default. Id. at 1161. Our proposal is paternalistic in the sense
that it intends to set a welfare maximizing default, however, given the importance of the
choices, we expect only a limited impact from this aspect of the plan. We see a much bigger
advantage from people actively considering the choices that they will face in their domestic
partnership.
166 See MINN. STAT. § 517.08 (2006) (establishing marriage license fee of $100 for couples
who do not undergo counseling and $30 for those who "[complete] at least 12 hours of
premarital education").
167 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(1) (2000) (stating that couple entering into covenant
marriage must sign declaration of intent including recitation that they have received
premarital counseling). These proposals are not limited to the United States. The Australian
Prime Minister John Howard recently "encouraged" pre-marriage classes as a way to reduce
the divorce rate. Mirka Bagaric, Time to End the Divorce Between Loyalty and the Family
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many churches already require pre-marriage counseling, our
proposal imposes very little additional burden on potential
8
spouses.16
Second, the check-off-the-box application minimizes extra costs.
The four standard forms are meant to reflect the majoritarian
preference for each type of domestic partnership as much as
possible. Potential spouses who truly want to avoid the up front
transaction costs can simply opt for the most appropriate standard
form. Third, the imposition of such up front
transaction costs may
1 69
also reduce future expenses of dissolution.
Despite the advantages of a contractual approach, Linda McClain
legitimately questions whether contract law can preserve the value
of "adult-adult interdependency."' v She asserts that "[a]long with
interdependency are bundled other goods associated with adultadult intimate affiliation: goods such as commitment, friendship,
relational responsibility, and taking an interest in the well-being of
another person." 7 ' These are not "goods," but are instead critical
aspects of familial adult relationships that require the protection
and status classification of domestic partners. We add here that
simple contract law also fails to respond to the needs of children
who are not typically parties to prenuptial agreements or domestic
contracts.'7 2 Thus, even though family law has moved from status

Law, http://www.onlineopinion.com.aulview.asp?article=4104 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
" The Catholic Church is well known for requiring pre-marriage counseling. See
generally GREGORY F. AUGUSTINE PIERCE, PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE (1997) (providing
worksheets for pre-marriage counseling). Many, if not most, Protestant churches also require
such counseling. For example, Spirit Restoration, which claims to be the "premier,
ecumenical Christian website," asserts that "most clergy (in Protestant churches] require a
serious pre-marriage counseling program with the engaged couple." Understanding
Observances and Rites of Religions, http://www.spiritrestoration.org/Church/Holidays/
Understanding-observances andrites_ofio20religions.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
169 At least one Australian legislator is on the record supporting this argument. See
Patricia Karvelas, PoliticiansWant to Get Between Your Sheets, AUSTRALIAN, Feb. 14, 2006,
at 11 (quoting Employment Minister Kevin Andrews: "We pay effectively billions of dollars
a year in the costs of marriage and relationship breakdown so I think there is a real role to
play up front [with pre-marriage education] in trying to help people make the best decisions
in the first place").
170 McClain, supra note 2, at 414.
171 Id. at 415.
172 But cf Spitko, supra note 161, at 1204 (arguing that courts should generally enforce
custody and visitation decisions resulting from contractually agreed arbitration).
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to contract, we propose preserving the status-based responsibilities
and privileges made more concrete via business partnership law.
B. INTRODUCTION TO PARTNERSHIP LAW

Before describing our four domestic partnership models, we
briefly review here the history and details of business partnership
law. Either the 1914 or 1997 version of the Uniform Partnership
Act governs partnerships in nearly all states.'7 3 Where relevant,
this Article highlights the differences between the two. Courts use
common law principles,'7 4 including most importantly those of
agency,' 75 to fill in the inevitable gaps of coverage and interpretation
in general partnership law.
Commentators generally argue that partnerships should be
viewed either as primarily contractarian (parties voluntarily
contract among themselves) 176 or as primarily relationship-based
(parties, by becoming partners, agree "to advance the collective
interest and not the short term individual interest of the

13 Louisiana is the only state that does not follow variants of the Uniform Partnership
Act. See Unif. P'ship Act, Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org/
update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (listing
states that have adopted the Act). We shall refer to the earlier version as the UPA, and the
1997 version as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, or RUPA. The UPA itself borrowed
heavily from the English Partnership Act of 1890, which was based on common law. Donald
J. Weidner, Pitfallsin PartnershipLaw Reform: Some United States Experience, 26 J. CORP.
LAW 1031, 1031 (2001). It was expressly intended to provide guidance on how a partnership
could run its affairs and be properly terminated. Commissioners Prefatory Note to the
Uniform Partnership Act (1914). The 1997 version was prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. A majority of states now generally follow RUPA,
but as many states have introduced their own provisions or have failed to promulgate RUPA's
provisions, uniformity has been imperfect. See Robert W. Hillman et al., THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 531-32 (2003) (listing states); see also Allan W. Vestal, "Assume
a Rather Large Boat.. .": The Mess We Have Made of PartnershipLaw, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 518 (1997) (noting and criticizing lack of uniformity among RUPA states).
174 See UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 104(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 78 (2001) ("Unless displaced by particular
provisions of [this act], the principles of law and equity supplement [this act]."); UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 5 (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 391 (2001) ("In any case not provided for in this act
the rules of law and equity... shall govern.").
7 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 4 (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 386 (2001).
176 J. Dennis Hynes, FiduciaryDutiesand RUPA: An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract,

58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 31 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform

PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45, 57 (1993).
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partner").' 77 This distinction becomes most relevant in determining
the fiduciary duties of the partners, with contractarians arguing for
fewer, less onerous, and more waivable duties. The UPA generally
reflects a relationship-based
approach, whereas RUPA is far more
78
contractarian. 1

Regardless of the choice of a contractarian or relationship-based
approach, partnership law is, for the most part, a system of default
rules, or a standard-form agreement. 71 It is enabling, in that
parties are generally free to agree on other inter se provisions that
may better suit them.'
For example, many partnerships do not
divide all profits equally (e.g., law firms that compensate partners
based on lock-step seniority or "eat-what-you-kill") or allow equal
voting (e.g., partnerships that are run by executive committees).
Partners may not, however, contract away all of their fiduciary
duties.'
Many partnerships, especially larger ones, prepare often complex
partnership agreements intended to govern their relationship in lieu
of or in addition to their state's partnership act. These agreements
are analogous to prenuptial or postnuptial agreements." 2 For these

177

Allan W. Vestal, FundamentalContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform Partnership

Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 527 (1993).
178 Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1994 Really Be
Retroactive?, 50 BUS. LAW. 267, 280 (1994).
179 See Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 397 (Md. 1999) ("[B]oth UPA and RUPA only apply
when there is either no partnership agreement governing the partnership's affairs, the
agreement is silent on a particular point, or the agreement contains provisions contrary to
law.").
xs RUPA § 103(b) explicitly states what provisions cannot be waived by the parties. UNIF.
P'sHipAcT § 103(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001). UPA does not make this clear. See Donald J.
Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: The Reporters' Overview,
49 Bus. LAw. 1, 2 (1993) (noting that under UPA "it is not clear which rules are merely
default rules and which rules are mandatory rules").
181 RUPA both limits fiduciary duties and allows some contracting around them. Delaware
may have gone the furthest in permitting the waiving of fiduciary duties. Section 15-103 of
Delaware's Revised Uniform Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 (2005), expressly provides
a list of non-waivable provisions that does not include the duty of loyalty. Id. § 15-103. In
addition, it states that '[it is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle
of freedom of contract." Id. § 15-103(d); see also Gelfman v. Weeden Investors, L.P., 792 A.2d
977,987 (Del. Ch. 2001); Hynes, supranote 176, at 459-64 (discussing Delaware as state most
likely to uphold a partnership agreement that completely waives duty of loyalty).
182 As in the business world, evidence of duress, undue influence, or coercion may void
such agreements. See generally Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage:
Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974) (discussing voidability of pre- and
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partnerships-both business and domestic-it is economically
efficient to alter the standard form agreement. Default rules govern
those who have entered into partnerships more casually, or even
inadvertently, or those for whom the economic value of the
partnership does not warrant the costs of a bespoke agreement.'8 3
These rules are generally intended to be majoritarian; they are the
rules that the parties would have chosen ex ante had the parties
themselves considered the matter." 4
Partnership law also governs a partnership's relationships with
third parties.'
These laws are generally enabling, except that the
partnership and any third party have to reach agreement in order
to change the rules. Partners alone cannot change the laws for
themselves.

postnuptial agreements). Further, they must be "made by competent parties, supported by
consideration, comply with any applicable statute of frauds and be consistent with public
policy." Emy Sigler, Comment, Elgar v. Probate AppeaL. The ProbateCourt's Implied Powers
to Construe and to Enforce Pre-NuptialAgreements, 9 CONN. PROB. L.J. 145, 148 (1994).
'83 Sometimes potential partners or their lawyers do not want to negotiate different
provisions for fear of ruining a relationship. As Klein and Giulati note, "[e]xperienced
practitioners are sensitive to the risk that focusing excessively on difficult organizational
issues and engaging in hard bargaining on behalf of clients may undermine trust and
cooperation and spoil a deal." William A. Klein & Mitu Gulati, Economic Organizationin the
ConstructionIndustry: A Case Study of CollaborativeProduction Under High Uncertainty,
1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 137, 172 (2004). The parties, or their lawyers, may fear that focusing
on potential problems will result in a partner withdrawing. Given the high divorce rate, see
supranote 3 and accompanying text, marriages are analogous. We would not be disappointed
if our proposal resulted in some domestic partnerships not being formed that otherwise would
have been formed.
18 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 15 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (arguing that "corporate law should contain
the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm's length for
every contingency sufficiently low"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372
(Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1986) (arguing that default rules should supply "standard contract
terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement"); cf. Ayres &
Gertner, supra note 163, at 91 (arguing that some default provisions, namely penalty
defaults, are actually intended not to be majoritarian, but rather "to give at least one party
to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose
affirmatively the contract provision they prefer"). But seegenerally Eric A. Posner, There Are
No Penalty Default Rules in ContractLaw (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 237, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=690403 (arguing that penalty default
rules, while theoretical possibilities, do not actually exist in the real world).
185 See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 301,6 U.L.A. 107 (1997) (specifying partner's power to bind
partnership with respect to third parties).
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C. FORMATION

The UPA defines a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 8 ' Personis
a broad term and includes "individuals, partnerships, corporations,
and other associations."8 7 Thus, other partnerships or corporations
can be partners. Co-ownership is not defined in either the UPA or
RUPA, but refers to functional ownership, such as rights of control,
as opposed to legal ownership. Business is also defined broadly to
include "every trade, occupation, or profession."'
Unlike other business forms, the law does not require statutory
filings or other formalities to form a partnership.8 9 In fact, parties
can form a partnership without meaning to accept its rights and
obligations and without realizing that the law has labeled their
relationship a partnership. 9 ° Although subjective intent and
186 UNIF. P'SHiPACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 393 (1914) (amended 1997); see also Comm'r v. Tower,
327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946) (stating that "[a] partnership is generally said to be created when
persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade,
profession, or business and when there is community of interest in the profits and losses");
Ward v. Thompson, 63 U.S. 330,333 (1859) (defining partnership as a contract"where parties
join together their money, goods, labor, or skill, for the purposes of trade or gain, and where
there is a community of profits"). Associations such as corporations or limited liability
companies formed under other statutes are excluded from partnership. UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. 393 (1914) (amended 1997); see also UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202(a), 6 U.L.A.
92 (1997) ("[Tihe association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for
profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.").
187 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 2, 6 U.L.A. 377 (1914) (amended 1997).
188 Id.
18

See id. §§ 6-7 (setting forth factors for determining whether or not partnership exists).

If the partnership is doing business under an assumed name, then an assumed name
certificate is required. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 36.11 (Vernon 2000) ("Any...
partnership... which regularly conducts business or renders professional services under an
assumed name.., shall file in the office of the Secretary of State .... ").
190 See, e.g., ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202

(2001) ("[Addition to RUPA] of the phrase, 'whether or not the persons intend to form a
partnership,' merely codifies the universal judicial construction of UPA Section 6(1) that a
partnership is created by the association of persons whose intent is to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit, regardless of their subjective intention to be 'partners.' Indeed, they
may inadvertently create a partnership despite their expressed subjective intention not to do
so."). For example, if Paul says he is going to buy a lottery ticket and Paula asks him to buy
one for her as well, a court may find that a partnership has been formed, with the result that
either party can claim half of what the two tickets are worth. See, e.g., Fitchie v. Yurko, 570
N.E.2d 892, 900-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding trial court's splitting of lottery winning
under joint venture analysis); Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. 1967)
(upholding agreement to purchase lottery ticket and divide proceeds as partnership); see also
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subjective awareness are probative but not dispositive, the parties'
relationship itself must be voluntary and consensual (even if they
did not intend to become partners in the legal sense)."' "[Alt the
heart of the partnership concept, is the principle that partners may
choose with whom they wish to be associated."'92 The partnership
begins when two or more parties manifest their
intentions-expressly or implicitly-of doing business together
(provided
they have not deliberately chosen a different business
93
1

form).

The two key elements in establishing the existence of a
partnership are that the parties share the profits and control of the
business.9 Sharing in the profits of a business, which is subject to
exceptions such as whether the profit is to pay a debt or wages,' 95
creates a rebuttable presumption that there is a partnership.'96
Sharing gross returns, however, does not establish a rebuttable
presumption of a partnership.'97 A partner does not need to actually

infra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing unintentional formation of domestic
partnership).
...See, e.g., Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[A]lthough the
manner in which the parties themselves characterize the relationship is probative, the
question ultimately is objective [intent].") (citing ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 2.05(c), at 2:36 (1988)).
'9
Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y. 1996) (internal quotation
omitted) (quoting Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)).
'93 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202 cmts. 1-2 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 95-96 (2001) (discussing that
partnership can be created regardless of subjective intention to be partners and partnership
form exists even if another form does not). One can also become a partner by estoppel, if one
acts or represents oneself as a partner, or allows another to do so, and a third party relies on
the representations. UNIF. P'SHIP AT § 308 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 128-29 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 16, 6 U.L.A. (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 661-62 (2001).
'9 See, e.g., Wood v. Phillips, 823 So. 2d 648, 653 (Ala. 2001) ("There is no settled test for
determining the existence of a partnership. That determination is made by reviewing all the
attendant circumstances, including the right to manage and control the business."); Gangl v.
Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574, 580 (N.D. 1979) ("Control is an indispensable component of coownership which, when combined with profit sharing, strongly suggests the existence of a
partnership.").
195 The full list of exceptions includes profits received in payment for a debt, wages, or
rent, to a representative of a deceased partner as an annuity, as interest on a loan, or as
consideration for the sale of property. UNIM. P'SHIP ACT § 7(4) (1914) (amended 1997),
6 U.L.A. 418 (2001).
196 Id.

197 Id. § 7(3), 6 U.L.A. 418 (2001).

20071

UNIFORM DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ACT

391

exercise control to create a partnership; merely having the power to
control is adequate. 9 '
When parties form a partnership, it is normally understood to be
either at will, for a term, or for a specific undertaking.'9 9 The type
of partnership is relevant for determining the rights of partners
upon its end.20 0
If a partnership exists, terms required by law to protect the
rights of third parties bind the partners.2 ' They cannot waive or
vary the state's default rules absent agreement to the contrary. 0 2
D. OPERATIONS

1. PartnerIs an Agent of the Partnership. Each partner is an
agent of the partnership for business purposes and can bind the
partnership, unless the partnership agreement limits the partner's
authority to do so and the party with whom the partner is dealing
is aware of the partner's limited authority. 20 3 A partner's act that
does not appear consistent with the carrying on of the business does
not bind the partnership, absent authorization by the partnership.2
As an agent, the partner has fiduciary responsibilities towards the

'8 See, e.g., Gangl,281 N.W.2d at 580 (discussing that partner must have right to exercise
control in management of business but may entrust that control exclusively in his associates).
'99 See UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 101 cmt. (1997), 6 U.L.A. 62-63 (2001) (stating that if partners
did not agree that partnership should expire at end of definite term or upon completion of a
particular undertaking, then partnership is at will).
2 Id.
20' See id. § 103(b)(10) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001) (stating that partnership agreement may
not restrict third party rights).
22 Id. § 103 cmt. 1, 6 U.L.A. 74 (2001).
moUNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 553 (2001) (showing
relationship ofpartner in partnership business). A partner does not, however, have authority
to put partnership property in trust to satisfy creditors, dispose of the business's goodwill,
confess ajudgment, submit a claim or liability to arbitration, or do anything that would make
it impossible to carry on the partnership's ordinary business. Id. § 9(3). Agency is useful here
for reasons of efficiency, particularly for larger partnerships.
204

Id. § 9(2).
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partnership,"' requiring that she conduct all partnership affairs
with appropriate diligence, skill, and competence.
A partner's wrongful act within the ordinary course of business
or with the partnership's authorization is imputed to the
partnership. °6 Such wrongful acts result in the partnership's joint
and several liability. °7
2. Management. Partners have equal rights to manage and
control the partnership. 2°8 A majority of partners may make
decisions regarding ordinary course-of-business matters, 20 9 but the
law requires unanimity for any other type of decision or to act
contrary to any provision of the partnership agreement.2 1 ° (Of
course in a two person partnership there is no difference between
unanimity and majority rule.) The UPA and RUPA require
unanimity for another party to join the partnership.2"1 ' Parties do
not have to exercise their rights and may contract them away. A
partner also has a property right in her participation in
management. 1 2

201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other to so act."). A fiduciary
is "a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of
another in matters connected with his undertaking." Id. § 13 cmt. a.
206 See UNIF. P'SHiP ACT § 13 (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 600 (2001) (showing when
partners wrongful acts bind partnership); see also id. § 14, 6 U.L.A. 611 (2001) (requiring
partnership bound by partner's breach of trust).
207 Id. § 15, 6 U.L.A. 613 (2001).
208 Id. § 18(e), 6(I1) U.L.A. 101 (2001); see, e.g., Parks v. Riverside Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.2d
175, 180 (10th Cir. 1962) (upholding right of each partner to have equal vote in partnership).
Exclusion of a partner from participation in the partnership's management will be grounds
for dissolution. See, e.g., Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(finding that "wrongful exclusion or 'freeze out' of one partner ... will be grounds for judicial
dissolution of the partnership"). Furthermore, the right to participate in management does
not require that there be any realistic chance of affecting partnership decisions. See, e.g., G
& S Inv. v. Belman, 700 P.2d 1358, 1365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that consent of
deceased general partner is not necessary to partnership decisions).
209 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001).
210 Id.; Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999, 1002 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting UNIF. P'SHIPACT
§ 18(h) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 107 (2001)); see also Nat'l Biscuit Co. v. Stroud,
106 S.E.2d 692,695 (N.C. 1959) (holding that majority of partnership was required to restrict
the authority of partner in conducting partnership's ordinary business).
211 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(g) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001).
212 Id. § 24, 6(I1) U.L.A. 291 (2001).
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Partners must disclose "true and full

information" regarding anything affecting the partnership if so
requested by any other partner.2 13 Some courts have used even
stronger language to define this obligation. For example, the
California Supreme Court observed that a partner may not obtain
any advantage by the "slightest misrepresentation [or] concealment"
from her copartner, regardless of any request.21 4 The UPA imputes
to all parties one partner's knowledge of any partnership matter,
except in cases of fraud against the partnership.2 1
4. Liabilities. All debts that the partnership cannot pay from
partnership assets become the personal liability of the partners. 6
Assuming that all partners are solvent, a partner shares in
partnership losses in a pro rata proportion equal to their share of
the profits. 1 7 A new partner is, however, only liable for the
partnership's preexisting obligations to the extent that partnership
property can satisfy the obligations.2 18 Partners are not entitled to
compensation for their work on behalf of the partnership.1 9
E. PROPERTY

A partnership owns all property brought in or contributed to the
partnership, all property acquired in the name of the partnership,
and all property acquired with partnership funds unless the
partnership indicates otherwise.2 20 Partners are liable as fiduciaries
to the partnership for any profit or benefits derived from the

213 Id. § 20, 6(11) U.L.A. 188 (2001); see, e.g., Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d 852, 859 (Colo.
1987) (noting that "e]ach partner has the right to demand and expect from the other a full,
fair, open and honest disclosure of everything affecting the relationship" (citation omitted)).
214 Leffv. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983).
215 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 12 (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 595 (2001).
218 The liability may be joint or joint and several depending on the type of debt. Id. § 15,
6 U.L.A. 613 (2001). The distinction is relevant only in terms of the procedures creditors take
to reach a partner's assets. RUPA simply provides that "partners are liable jointly and
severally for all obligations of the partnership." UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A.

117 (2001).
217 UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001).
218 Id.
§ 17, 6 U.L.A. 681 (2001).
§ 18(f), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001). Partners are entitled to compensation for work
219 Id.
performed in the winding up of the partnership. Id.
o Id. § 8(1)-(3), 6 U.L.A. 532 (2001).
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partnership or its property. 221 A partner has three property rights:
(1) rights in specific partnership property, (2) the interest in the
partnership itself, and (3) rights to participate in the management
of the partnership.2 2 2 Of most importance here is a partner's right
as a co-owner with the other partners in specific partnership
This interest is also known as a "tenant in
property.
A partner may only use the property for
partnership."223
partnership purposes, unless the other partners consent to her
personal use.224 A creditor may not attach or execute a partner's
right in specific partnership property based on a claim solely against
the partner. 225 Likewise, the right in specific partnership property
is not subject to several personal encumbrances that may burden
marriage or family relationships (such as "dower, curtesy, or
allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin"). 22 6
F. FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Partners have robust fiduciary obligations to each other 227 and
are often viewed as trustees with respect to copartners.2 28 One court
229
described the duties owed as "the utmost good faith and loyalty."
The general purpose is to ensure scrupulously fair dealing among

Id. § 21, 6(11) U.L.A. 194 (2001).
Id. § 24, 6(11) U.L.A. 291 (2001).
m Id. § 25(1), 6(11) U.L.A. 294 (2001); see Kraus v. Kraus, 164 N.E. 743, 744 (N.Y. 1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.) (discussing partners' use of property as tenant in partnership).
224 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 25(2)(a) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(II) U.L.A. 294 (2001).
221 Id. § 25(2)(c) (stating that "partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject
to attachment or execution").
226 Id. § 25(2)(e).
227 The duty of loyalty is most relevant to our discussion; however, partners also owe each
other a duty of care. The duty of care is sometimes "limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."
UNIF. P'siuP AcT § 404(c) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001). Some courts, however, apply a more
familiar negligence standard. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988)
(stating that partner's duty of care is "[tlo act with that degree of diligence, care and skill
which ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions").
2' See, e.g., Leff v. Gunter, 658 P.2d 740, 744 (Cal. 1983) (stating partners are to act as
trustees for one another). But cf Larry E. Ribstein, Are PartnersFiduciaries?,2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 209,213 (arguing that courts' references to broad fiduciary duties are frequently"just
a way to help rationalize a result the court would, and could, have reached on other grounds").
2 Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952).
221

222

2007]

UNIFORM DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP ACT

395

partners, reflecting that their relationship is one of trust and
confidence.2 3 ° Judge Cardozo in the well-known case2"' of Meinhard
v. Salmon, (over)stated that:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another,
while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest
Many forms of conduct permissible in a
loyalty.
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As
to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at
a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will
not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this
232

court.

23 See, e.g., Hooper v. Yoder, 737 P.2d 852, 859 (Colo. 1987) (stating partners are in
relationship of trust and confidence). It is interesting to note that courts consider parties to
a prenuptial agreement as mutual fiduciaries. See, e.g., Sogg v. Nev. State Bank, 832 P.2d
781, 784 (Nev. 1992) (finding "presumed fiduciary relationship" between fiancdes); Gail
Frommer Brod, PremaritalAgreements and GenderJustice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229,262
(1994) (stating that most states hold parties negotiating prenuptial agreement to "highest
standards of good faith and fair dealing").
31 The case has often been cited. Shephardizing the case on Westlaw on October 21, 2006
reveals 2890 total cites. One commentator concluded: "Meinhardhas aged well. No case of
its period is of comparable contemporary influence in the business law area ... [and it]
continues to guide courts in determining the duties business partners owe one another."
Robert W. Hillman, Business Partnersas Fiduciaries:Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine,
22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 53 (2000); see also Ribstein, supra note 228, at 210 (referring to
Cardozo's words as "perhaps the most famous judicial expression of fiduciary duties").
232 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted). The distinction between "joint
adventurer" and partner is not crystal clear, but may merely reflect that the joint venture has
a narrower scope than the partnership. See Annotation, What Amounts to Joint Adventure,
138 A.L.R. 968 (1942) (stating joint adventure is sometimes regarded as partnership). Joint
adventurers would thus, if anything, have weaker fiduciary duties than partners.
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233
According to at least one state court, this standard still controls.

In an early case the Supreme Court provided examples of what
partners cannot do:
The general principles... admit of no question, it being
well settled that one partner cannot, directly or
indirectly, use partnership assets for his own benefit;
that he cannot, in conducting the business of a
partnership, take any profit clandestinely for himself;
that he cannot carry on the business of the partnership
for his private advantage; that he cannot carry on
another business in competition or rivalry with that of
the firm, thereby depriving it of the benefit of his time,
skill, and fidelity without being accountable to his
copartners for any profit that may accrue to him
therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for
himself that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for
the firm of which he is a member; nor can he avail
himself of knowledge or information, which may be
properly regarded as the property of the partnership, in
the sense that it is available or useful to the firm for any
purpose within the scope of the partnership business.2 3 4
The RUPA, because it is more contract oriented than the UPA, has
a generally narrower set of fiduciary duties. 235 The duties of care
and loyalty are a partner's only fiduciary duties under the RUPA.2 36
To meet the duty of care, a partner must simply refrain "from
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law."237 The duty of loyalty
requires that a partner not appropriate partnership opportunities
or property, not deal with the partnership as an adversely

m In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (stating Cardozo's standard
still controls).
234 Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893).
'5 See Della Ratta v. Larkin, 856 A.2d 643, 650, 659 n.15 (Md. 2004) (opining that "RUPA
narrowly defines the fiduciary duties of partners").
2' UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 404(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).
27

Id. § 404(c).
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interested party, and not compete with the partnership before its
dissolution.2 3
The RUPA's approach to fiduciary duties was
probably the most controversial change from the UPA.23 9
Interestingly, although a majority of states have implemented a
version of the RUPA, some of those states have retained a
traditional fiduciary view of partners' obligations.240
Courts have decided numerous partnership fiduciary duty cases,
with the outcome invariably depending upon the specific facts.24 1
Often, especially in appropriating partnership opportunity cases (as
in the Latta v. Kilbourn and Meinhard v. Salmon cases cited above)
and partnership competition cases, the scope of the business agreed
to by the partners determines the case's resolution. A breach of
fiduciary duty can result in a partner's liability even after the
termination of the partnership.2 4 2

m Id. § 404(b). For a criticism of this limited contractarian approach to fiduciary duties,
see J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: Fiduciary Duties Under the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 109, 123-60 (1997) (noting that limited contractarian approach departs
from prior law, is too uncertain, and undermines enforcement).
239 See, e.g., Callison, supranote 238 (criticizing RUPA's fiduciary duty approach); Claire
Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriateto AppropriateCorporateConcepts: FiduciaryDuties and
the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 146 (1993) (stating that RUPA
clearly rejects concept that partner must act " 'solely on behalf of the partnership' ");
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A CorporateLawyer Looks at RUPA's Fiduciary
Provisions, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 474-75 (1997) (suggesting that RUPA § 404(e)
permits partner to further his own interest without violating his fiduciary duty); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45,
52-55 (1993) (discussing RUPA's provisions for revised fiduciary duties); Vestal, supra note
177, at 535-37 (criticizing changes as radical and unnecessary).
240 See Michael Haynes, Comment, Partners Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest
Loyalty ... or Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which PartnersMay Limit Their Duty
of Loyalty to One Another, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 433, 454-71 (2005) (evaluating Texas,
Delaware, Ohio, Illinois, California, and New York).
21 See Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1219 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
"[iln a partnership the extent of the fiduciary duty owed by one partner to another varies from
case to case depending on the circumstances").
22 The Oregon Supreme Court used this colorful metaphor:
When a partner wrongfully snatches a seed of opportunity from the
granary of his firm, he cannot, thereafter, excuse himself from sharing with
his copartners the fruits of its planting, even though the harvest occurs
after they have terminated their association. The stewardship of the erring
member dates from the initial appropriation and continues until he is
exonerated by a proper accounting.
Fouchek v. Janicek, 225 P.2d 783, 793 (Or. 1950).
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G. TERMINATION
24 3
Any partner can withdraw from any partnership at any time.
The consequences of withdrawing, however, vary depending on
whether it was done rightfully or wrongfully. In addition, the
ending of any partnership is really a process with three separate
parts. Under the UPA, there is first a "dissolution," followed by the
"winding up," and finally the "termination."2 "
The UPA uses the term "dissolution" to refer to the "change in
the relation of partners" that results when a partner "ceases to be
associated" with the partnership.2 45 For example, a partner's death
or a court order will cause the dissolution of the partnership.24 s
Likewise, the completion of a partnership's particular undertaking
or the expiration of the specified terms will cause dissolution.2 4 1 On
the other hand, if the partners agree otherwise or continue to act
like partners, the partnership becomes a partnership at will. 248 The
term "winding up" is the process of resolving all of the partnership's
outstanding obligations.24 9 When all obligations have been resolved,
only then does the partnership terminate.2 5 °
Any partner always has the power, merely by express will, to
cause dissolution (and thus initiate a winding up and
termination). 25 ' The partner may not, however, have the right to

m As a partnership is a form of contract, breach is permitted. Courts will almost never,
however, order specific performance, in the sense of forcing people to remain against their
wishes in a partnership. See, e.g., In re Ben Franklin Hotel Associates, 186 F.3d 301, 310 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that "[riarely, if ever, will a court specifically compel the performance of a
partnership contract because that contract is essentially personal in character"); Logan v.
Logan, 675 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (same). A court may order alternative
remedies that will yield an economically similar result.
2
In an attempt to avoid confusion, the RUPA uses the terms "dissociation," "dissolution,"
and "winding up" to replace "dissolution," "winding up," and "termination." UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 601 (1997), 6 U.L.A. 163-64 (2001). Confusion remains, and the terms are often used
imprecisely. Cf Estate of McKay's, 343 N.E.2d 45, 51 (111. App. Ct. 1976) (noting inherent
ambiguity in "terminate" and "winding up").
M UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 29 (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 349 (2001).
2" Id. § 31(4), (6), 6(11) U.L.A. 370 (2001).
247 Id. § 31(1).
Id. § 23, 6(11) U.L.A. 289 (2001).
4 See, e.g., Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2001) (distinguishing
"winding up" from "termination").
25 See, e.g., id. at 85 (noting that "termination" occurs when "partnership is wound up").
251 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 31(2)(1914) (amended 1997), 6(II) U.L.A. 370 (2001); see, e.g., Collins
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cause dissolution. This is true when a dissolution would result in
the partnership's termination prior to the completion of an agreed
term or the accomplishment of a specific undertaking.2 5 2 Unless the
partners intend otherwise, under both the UPA and RUPA a partner
may sever her relationship with the partnership at will without
suffering any penalty. 3
Exercising the power of dissolution without the right to do so
results in wrongful dissolution, in which case other partners are
entitled to seek damages.25 4 A partner who does not have the right
to cause dissolution may instead seek a court order.25 5 Courts have
wide discretion to grant dissolution.2 56 A court shall decree a
dissolution if a partner is of unsound mind,2 57 can no longer perform
her part of the partnership agreement, 2 8 is guilty of wrongdoing
that prejudices the continuation of the business, 259 willfully or
persistently breaches the partnership agreement,2 6 ° or behaves in
such a way that continuing the business is not reasonably
A court can also decree a dissolution if the
practicable. 261

v. Lewis, 283 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. App. 1955) (noting that "there always exists the power"
to terminate at will). RUPA uses the term dissociation. See UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 602(a) (1997),
6 U.L.A. 169 (2001) ('A partner has the power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or
wrongfully, by express will .... ).
252 See, e.g., Collins, 283 S.W.2d at 261 (distinguishing 'legal right" from "power"). Courts
will often imply a term or the accomplishment of a specific undertaking in order to avoid
opportunistic dissolutions. See, e.g., Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713, 716-17 (Cal. 1941) (finding
that procedure for dissolution did not disrupt "competitive spirit" of bidding).
2M UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 803(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 199 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1914)
(amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 370 (2001).
2
UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 38(2) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 487 (2001).
' Id. § 32(1) ("On application by . .. a partner the court shall decree a dissolution
whenever....").
26
25
258

Weissman v. Henkin, 34 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. 1943).
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(1)(a) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 404 (2001).

Id. § 32(1)(b).

"' Id. § 32(1)(c).

260 Id. § 32(1)(d). Refusing to allow a partner to participate in management is one example
of this. See, e.g., Herman v. Pepper, 166 A. 587, 588 (Pa. 1933) (noting that exclusion from
management is undoubtably grounds for dissolution).
261 UNIF. P'SHIPACT § 32(1)(d) (1964) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 404 (2001).
This is the
"jerk"provision. Courts do not want to require people to continue in partnership with grossly
unreasonable and unpleasant partners. See, e.g., Owen v. Cohen, 119 P.2d 713, 715 (Cal.
1941) (holding that lower court was justified in granting dissolution where "breach between
the partners was due in large measure to defendant's persistent endeavors to become the
dominating figure of the enterprise and to humiliate plaintiff before the employees and
customers").
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partnership's business cannot be profitable2 62 or through the catchall
that "[olther circumstances render a dissolution equitable."2 6 3
Dissolution does not result in the immediate end of the
partnership. Before ending, the partnership will complete any work
in progress, settle with creditors, sell all assets, and divide any
remainder among the partners.2 The partnership's business may
be sold as a going concern or the assets may be sold separately.26 5
Partnership assets are allocated first to creditors other than
partners, second to repay loans from partners, and third to repay
partners' capital contributions.26 6 Any remaining profits are
distributed to the partners.2 6 7 Partners may have to contribute
additional amounts to satisfy the partnership's liabilities.268 When
all of the partnership's obligations have been addressed, the
partnership terminates. 9
If the dissolution was wrongful, the wrongdoer suffers both a loss
of all of her interest in the goodwill of the business 270 and is liable
for a breach of contract action and resulting contract damages."'
Confusingly, even if dissolution is not wrongful (e.g., the dissolution
262

UNIF. P'SHP ACT § 32(1)(e) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 404 (2001).

263

Id. § 32(1)(f).

264

See, e.g., id. § 30, 6(I1) U.L.A. 354 (2001) (postponing partnership's end until "winding

up of partnership affairs is completed"); Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir.
2001) (noting that activities of partnership in dissolution are limited). Under RUPA, the
dissociation of a partner from an at-will partnership does not necessarily result in the
winding up and termination of the partnership. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 601 cmts. 1, 8 (1997), 6
U.L.A. 164-65 (2001).
26 Kinney v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 656, 662 (W.D. La. 1964) (differentiating sale of
assets and sale as going concern).
266 UNIF. P'SHlp ACT § 40(b) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 509 (2001).
267 Id.
268 Id. § 40(d). Partnerships do not operate under a limited liability regime. See id.
(requiring partners contribute proportionate shares to cover insolvent partner's liabilities).
269 Id. § 30, 6(II) U.L.A. 354 (2001). See, e.g., In re Weiss, 111 F.3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir.
1997) (noting that partners cannot escape obligations by dissolving partnership).
270 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(II) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 481 (2001). The
goodwill of the business can be thought of as the value of the business above and beyond the
value of the business's assets. 38A C.J.S. Goodwill § 2 (2006). Generally goodwill is the
difference between the business's liquidation value and its value as a going-concern. Id.
Under RUPA, the wrongdoer is entitled to her share of any goodwill. See UNIF. P'SHIP
ACT § 701 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 175 (2001) (providing that wrongdoer receives goingconcern value less damages for wrongful dissociation).
271 UNIF. P'sHip ACT § 38(2) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 487-88 (2001). See, e.g.,
Geczy v. Lachappelle, 636 P.2d 604, 608 (Alaska 1981) (upholding award of damages for
breach of contract).
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of a partnership at will) and contract damages are unavailable,
damages may still be available on a breach of fiduciary duty
2
27

theory.

V. SOMETHING NEW-UNIFORM DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP

If families are truly the bedrock of our nation's strength,2 73 then
we need to foster families of all kinds. In particular, if families
function primarily to provide care and support,2 74 then we should
subsidize and protect the people willing to assume those domestic
responsibilities.7 5 Marriage, however, has evolved to emphasize
love, self-fulfillment, and companionship, and is less likely to
promote economic security, responsibility, familial alliance, and
domestic sacrifice than it did hundreds of years ago.276 Thus,

22

See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41,44 (Cal. 1961) (stating that power to dissolve "must

be exercised in good faith"); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 n.6 (Mass. 1989)
(observing that plaintiff may still have remedy even if dissolution of partnership at will was
not wrongful).
273 President Bush's website declares:
THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY: The President and Mrs. Bush believe parents
and family are the first and most important influence in every child's life,
providing a foundation of love and support. The President's FY 2006
budget supports families in many ways, including:
" Promoting Responsible Fatherhood: The President requested $40
million for a new fatherhood initiative to be awarded in competitive
grants to faith-based and community organizations for skill-based
marriage and parenting education, and other services that help fathers
provide emotional and financial support to their children.
" Encouraging Healthy Marriages: The President has requested $100
million for a state-based competitive matching grant program to support
healthy marriages, and an additional $100 million for research,
demonstration projects, and technical assistance on family formation
and healthy marriage activities.
News Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Making a Difference For America's Youth (Mar.
7, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050307-5.html.
274 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying
text.
171

See Edward A. Zelinsky, DeregulatingMarriage: The Pro-MarriageCase forAbolishing

Civil Marriage,27 CARDOzO L. REv. 1161, 1163-66 (2006) (arguing that state sponsored
marriage should be abolished); cf Bernstein, supra note 10, at 211-12 (examining whether
state-sponsored marriage should be abolished in favor of private ordering, but concluding that
civil marriage offers compelling benefits).
276 Marsha Garrison suggested that cohabitation expresses an" 'individualisticethic...
in which personal happiness and fulfillment hold the highest value.'" Garrison, supra note
8, at 22 (quoting Kathryn Edin et al., A Peek Inside the Black Box: What MarriageMeans for
Poor UnmarriedParents,66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1007, 1011 (2004)).
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Americans need a new option, a unifying structure that does not
carry the baggage of subordination and that can facilitate economic
and strategic legal planning to benefit loving domestic partners.
Americans need an option that satisfies constitutional strictures and
leaves marriage to the exclusive control of the religious
institutions.27 7 Domestic partnership, based on traditional business
partnership law, provides a near-perfect structure. v8 Moreover,
domestic partners can still choose to marry (without legal effect),
assuming that their chosen religious institution will perform a
marriage ceremony for them.
A. THE PROPOSAL-OVERVIEW

This Article proposes a legal regime for ordering domestic
partnerships based on the UPA: the Uniform Domestic Partnership
Act (UDPA).2 79 Under this new system, a domestic partnership is
simply "an association of two (2) adult persons to form a single
economically and emotionally supportive family."28" An additional
requirement is that no person may be in more than one domestic
partnership at a time. 2 11 Note that per this definition, these couples
17 Edward Zelinsky also argues in favor of leaving marriage to churches, and he favors
no role for the state in any form of domestic union. Zelinksy, supra note 275, at 1163-66.
" Other scholars have promoted different structures. For example, Judith Stacey
recommends registered kinship based on an adult-adult dyad. See generallyJUDITH STACEY,
IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996)
(illustrating effectiveness of nontraditional family models); JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW

FAMILES: STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990)

(examining two families; recognition of nuclear family); Judith Stacey, TowardEqualRegard
for Marriages and Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331 (2003)
(exploring families in nonmarriage contexts).
279 Again, we cannot anticipate every nuanced application of our proposal in an article of
this length; however, we attempt here to provide an overview sufficient to begin an academic
conversation about our proposal. Illustrative provisions of the Uniform Domestic Partnership
Act are attached as APPENDIX B.
m See infra APPENDIX B, § 6. Cf UNEF. P'SHIPACT § 6(1) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A.
393 (2000) (defining a business partnership).
28' See infra APPENDIX B, § 18(e). Conceivably, one could serve as a partner in more than
one domestic partnership, just as business partners may belong to more than one business
partnership. Business partners, however, run the risk of breaching their fiduciary duty of
loyalty when they belong to partnerships engaged in similar businesses. Lawyers, for
example, almost never belong to more than one law partnership at the same time. This Act
is predicated on the assumption that a domestic partner's fiduciary duties to the other
partner and to any limited partners effectively preclude participation in more than one. In
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are not necessarily sexually intimate nor do they necessarily live in
the same residence. 28 2 This definition allows for commuter families
that are split geographically, perhaps because of jobs or family
responsibilities, but whose members still consider themselves a
familial unit. Although we believe that this definition is a highly
defensible compromise based on the caregiving functions of a family,
we note that our proposal still has advantages even if it uses a
different definition of domestic partnership. Reasonable people
might favor a definition that is narrower (perhaps requiring that the
domestic partners be romantically involved) or broader (perhaps to
allow more than two adults to form a single domestic partnership).
Most couples (like many small business partnerships) lack the
resources-time, cognitive ability, 2 3 and technical expertise to
negotiate their own custom-made domestic partnership agreement.
Additionally, they lack the financial resources to hire experts. Our
proposal serves societal interests and encourages family unity when
governments recognize standardized domestic partnership options,
created via a uniform partnership application and based on what
parties would likely choose for themselves if they had the
resources.84 More precisely, we recommend four standard domestic
partnership models because there are four typical structures for
domestic ordering. These different models have somewhat different
majoritarian preferences."' A couple's ex ante choices, effectuated
addition, a partner participating in multiple domestic partnerships raises equitable problems,
such as for the allocation of health benefits.
282 But cf PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, at 916 (defining domestic partners as two persons
who share same residence).
2"3 In particular, we note that people getting married suffer from an optimistic bias. See
Baker & Emery, supra note 19, at 443 (observing that almost 100% of couples report before
their marriage that they will not get divorced, notwithstanding actual divorce rate of roughly
50%). Of course, an optimistic bias is not limited solely to marriage. See generally David
Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education and the
Workplace, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 69 (2004) (reviewing data "showing that people's
perceptions of their skills, knowledge, personality, and character often do not mesh with
objective reality").
4 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
8 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, A StandardFormApproach to Same-Sex Marriage,38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 309 (2005) (presenting some theoretical arguments in favor of an
"interstate market for standard forms" of marriage, without taking a position on what
provisions such standard forms should contain); see also Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra note
100, at 606-08 (arguing in favor of state experimentation regarding domestic and civil rights
issues).
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by their check-off-the-box responses on the application, dictate the
appropriate partnership form.2" 6
Based on our assessment of the likely goals and needs of
significant numbers of potential families, we propose the following
four standard forms for domestic partnerships:. v the enduring,
provisional, filial, and caregiving domestic partnerships.
The enduring domestic partnership, as its name suggests, is
intended to continue until one of the partners dies. It may
terminate earlier, however, if one pursues that option. An enduring
domestic partnership unites couples who intend to stay childless
and are vulgarly known today by the acronym "DINKS"--double
income no kids. This partnership form closely resembles the current
institution of state supported marriage. Although intended for
people who plan to spend their lives together, the enduring
partnership would entail minimum mutual obligations in the event
of dissolution before death.2"' In essence, it would be analogous to
an at-will business partnership.
The provisional domestic partnership serves those partners who
wish to form a domestic partnership but are not sure that they want
to commit to each other for life. A provisional domestic partnership
replaces "trial marriages " "' and might also be popular with those
couples who view cohabitation as a type of trial marriage.2 9
Broadly speaking, this type of partnership is analogous to hand
fasting,2 9 ' Indonesian contract marriage,29 2 or the mut'a.2 93 Because

See infra APPENDIX A.
287 These four standard forms need not be set in stone. States should monitor form usage
and make appropriate modifications or expand the number of these standard forms based on
experience with the needs of families.
' In the event the couple does have children, both partners would be obligated to provide
for the children.
' See Deborah Schupack, 'Starter'Marriages: So Early, So Brief, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
1994, at C1 (quoting term suggested by Margaret Mead in 1960s describing marriage of finite
period during which couple could decide whether they would have children and form
permanent union); see also Betel Nuts Beat Out Flower for Aboriginal Lovebirds, TAIPEI
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.taipeitimes.comNews/taiwan/archives/
2006/02/14/2003292956 (discussing similar practice among Tao People, Taiwanese aborigines).
290 See Paul Storer, Catholic Students Explore Perspectives on Cohabitation,CATHOLIC
EXPLORER, Feb. 16,2006, http'//www.catholicexplorer.com/explore4325/atd/catholic-studentsexplore.shtml (showing that cohabitating couples view that relationship as "trial marriage").
9' See 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1072 (2d ed. 1989) ("Formerly treated as an
uncanonical, private, or even probationary form of marriage."); Wikipedia, Handfasting,
986
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a provisional domestic partnership lasts for only one year and is
renewable annually if the partners so choose, this type of
partnership is analogous to a business partnership for a term.29 4
The filial domestic partnership, as the name indicates, benefits
those couples who intend to rear children together and the children
themselves. In the event that the partners have children, either
naturally, with the assistance of reproductive technologies, or
through adoption, the children become domestic dependents. The
partners must support their children in a manner consistent with
their ex ante promises, but in no case less generously than the statemandated floor. This type of domestic partnership is analogous to
a business partnership for a particular undertaking, e.g., raising
children to emancipation, with the wrinkle that the adults are like
general partners whereas the children are like limited
partners-beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations without any right of
control.
A second type of domestic partnership modeled loosely on a
business partnership for a particular undertaking is the caregiving
domestic partnership. While we regard all forms of domestic
partnership as having a caregiving aspect, this form favors adults
who agree in advance to divide income earning and domestic
caregiving-or partnership maintaining-tasks unequally. It serves
so called traditional couples, based on the Ozzie and Harriet
model,2 9 with one partner working outside the home and the other

http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handfasting (last visited Feb. 15,2007) (discussing Celtic origins
and modern practices).
2 See Julie Chao, No Wedded Bliss: Indonesia Women Seek Rights, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Apr. 10, 2005, at C4 (describing contract marriages, common in some parts of Indonesia, as
merely temporary relationship, lasting between a week and a year, and lacking legal
recognition, even though performed by Muslim cleric).
29 The mut'a or "temporary marriage" was a pre-Islamic, Middle Eastern convention
designed to allow sexual outlets for men and women under certain
circumstances without subjecting them to the otherwise harsh penalties for
nonmarital sex .....
In these temporary marriages the man and woman
had no obligation toward each other once the contract was over. But if the
woman bore a child as a result of the relationship, that child was legitimate
and was entitled to share in the father's inheritance.
COONTZ, supra note 1, at 29.
2?4See Garrison, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that cohabitation typically lasts less than 1.5
years).
' The Adventures ofOzzie andHarrietwas a long running television program that is now
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in the home. It also serves persons, such as siblings or the adult
child and parent, who cannot now marry but can form unions, such
as those currently allowed in several states.296 The parties may
specify a term of years or other end date for this partnership such
as the occurrence of a particular event or they may choose to commit
for life. If a partner terminates this partnership before the
anticipated term end, the income earner meets support obligations
until the domestic caretaker or dependent retools for the
marketplace or enters another domestic partnership.
In the next subparts, we look at how couples form and operate
domestic partnerships, address liabilities, and deal with the
consequences of termination.
1. Formation. To create a domestic partnership, participants
must complete and sign a relatively simple check-off-the-box
application form and pay any applicable state or federal fees. 97
APPENDIX A is an example of such an application form. Unlike the
general partnership, but like more recently enacted business
forms, 298 a domestic partnership commences only if the parties act

intentionally in forming the partnership.299 Once the clerk gives the

viewed as "an idealized portrait of the American nuclear family." The Museum of Broadcast
Communications, The Adventures ofOzzie and Harriet, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/
A/htmlAladventuresof/adventuresof.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). Harriet was viewed as
the quintessential 1950s homemaker whereas Ozzie was the breadwinning paterfamilias. Id.
29 See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
" We anticipate that states would charge a fee similar to that charged for marriage
licenses. These fees currently range from $4 in Massachusetts to Florida's $88.50, lowered
to $56 if the couple takes a four hour course. The Bride to Be Channel, supra note 17. We
also anticipate that Congress could adopt this system to be administered by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services. If the government created a federal database
for partnership administration, it could better monitor demographics, statistical information,
child support compliance, and census information. But see also Krotoszynski & Spitko, supra
note 100, at 601, 606-08 (arguing against federalization of marriage law in response to
narrowing, rather than expansion, of rights for same-sex partners).
"8 See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(b) (Vernon 1996) (amended 1997)
(illustrating limited liability partnership act); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 201 (1984) (requiring
filing for creation of corporation); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 202 (1996), 6A U.L.A. 578 (2003)
(requiring filing articles of organization with Secretary ofState); UNIF. LTD. P'sHp ACT § 201
(2001), 6A U.L.A. 33 (2003) (setting forth procedural requirements for formation of limited
partnership). Even RUPA, applicable to general partnerships, provides for voluntary state
filings regarding partnership authority. UNIF. P'SHIPACT, § 105(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 80 (2001).
9 See supra notes 189-202 and accompanying text. An unintentional domestic
partnership would be the rough equivalent of a common law marriage based on cohabitation.
Common law marriage, however, is now defunct in most states for a variety of reasons. See
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application his approval, essentially a ministerial action designed
to ensure that the putative domestic partners have answered each
question,3 00 the government issues a domestic partnership license
after a seventy-two hour cooling off period.3"'
The application form includes sections for the disclosure of all
existing separate assets and liabilities, for the declaration of
children and other dependents, and for the voluntary, confidential
declaration of health issues such as HIV, alcoholism, and genetic
risk factors.3" 2 Obviously, each party has a duty of disclosure to the
other party, and partnership law would construe any failure to meet
this duty against the non-discloser.0 3 Thus, for example, if a party

Sonya C. Garza, Common Law Marriage: A Proposalfor the Revival of a Dying Doctrine, 40
NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 543-45 (2006) (citing reasons for decline and noting that only twelve
U.S. jurisdictions now recognize it); see also JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW 144 (5th ed. 2006)
(explaining that common law marriage became less acceptable as society grew and became
more complex). Like many states that have rejected common law marriage, we too reject the
unintentional formation of domestic partnerships. We are proposing our system to formalize
relationships so that people must consider their relationship before such formalization-goals
which are not served by unintentional actions. Of course we understand that, of those states
which do recognize common law marriage, almost all require intentionality. See, e.g., TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a) (Vernon 2005) (requiring either declaration of marriage or
representation to others of marriage). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-1-4.5 (listing no specific
intent requirements). Requiring a state or federal filing also serves this formalization
function.
" In the event that the states or the United States establish a national database for
domestic partnerships, state clerks could also verify that neither partner has either
undisclosed domestic dependents or a preexisting domestic partnership that has not been
terminated. The prospect of a national database may become more likely if Congress passes
Louisiana Senator Mary Landrieu's Proud Father Act, scheduled to be introduced in late
2006. The legislation will create a national registry of unwed fathers to protect their parental
rights. See Tamar Lewin, Unwed FathersFight for Babies Placedfor Adoption by Mothers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at Al (making reference to proposed litigation).
30" Many states allow cooling-off periods for certain kinds of contracts. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 24-5-10-8 (West 2006) (allowing for a cancellation period for consumer transactions
completed at home). A cooling-off period is equally justifiable in the domestic partnership
scenario. Although the check-off-the-box approach should reduce impulsive actions, a coolingoff period allows for additional deliberation. Some states allow for the annulment of
marriages and could provide for the annulment of a domestic partnership. See, e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-11-10 to -11 (West 2006) (providing for annulment of voidable marriage).
302 See APPENDIX A.
o Requiring spousal disclosure or actual knowledge is consistent with some applications
of current marriage law. See, e.g., Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815,821 (Tenn. 1996)
("[Tihe spouse seeking to enforce an antenuptial agreement must prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, either that a full and fair disclosure of the nature, extent, and value of his or
her holdings was provided to the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement, or that disclosure
was unnecessary because the spouse seeking to avoid the agreement had independent
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fails to list an asset as existing individual property, the law would
consider the asset a partnership asset. In the event of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, a court would consider any knowing or
negligent failure to list a preexisting liability-perhaps a gambling
debt, or a child by a prior relationship.0 4
2. Operations. A partner is an agent for the general partnership
for the purpose of its business. 30 ' For domestic partnerships, we
construe the scope of a partnership's "business" very narrowly to
avoid potentially perverse outcomes. 0 6 We would not, for example,
want to impose liability on an innocent partner for the gambling
debts or torts of the other partner. Our proposal limits domestic
partner agency to decisions regarding the partnership or other
partner's welfare when the other partner is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to make rational decisions .3 07 Thus, a domestic
partner typically has no authority to act for the partnership except
in the case of a partner's incapacitation.0 8
As a result of a domestic partner's limited authority and to be
consistent with current marriage law, third parties can enforce
contracts only against the maker and not against the other domestic
partner or against the partnership as a whole. 30 9 A contractor

knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of the proponent spouse's holdings.").
" See infra notes 339-45.
305 UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 553 (2001).
N6 Kahlil Gibran emphasized that the parties to a marriage must retain their own form
and strength in order to bolster the union. GIBRAN, supra note 27. We agree that partners
will better serve a union if they can retain some autonomy while building a family. We also
want to avoid the recreation of the feme covert-a woman under the protection of her
husband. Most importantly, the "business" of these partnerships is the creation of happy
families. People, not institutions, make emotionally supportive families. Thus, the
partnership has no business other than supporting the people who make the family, if they
should need that support.
o See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-1-5 (West 2006) (authorizing spouse to provide consent
for medical treatment when patient is incapable of so consenting).
' A business partner's ability to act for the partnership is limited if the partnership so
agrees and if the third party with which the business partner is dealing has knowledge of the
lack of authority. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 9(1) (1914) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 553 (2001). The
default is thus that each domestic partner lacks authority, and that third parties know this.
"0 There is a broad exception for necessary expenses, such as medical treatment, incurred
for a spouse or minor child-the doctrine of necessaries-that we would retain. See, e.g., Yale
Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Harun Fountain, 838 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Conn. 2004)
(acknowledging doctrine of necessaries despite repeal of statutory codification of rule
following state's adoption of Uniform Commercial Code); Schmidt v. Mut. Hosp. Serv., Inc.,
832 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that parents were obliged to pay for child's
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wishing to hold both domestic partners liable on the contract must
ensure that they both contractually agree to be parties. Those
persons who want their domestic partner to serve as an agent more
broadly can grant a standard power of attorney. Similarly, domestic
partnership will not change the current legal regime for tort victims.
Any victim of a domestic partner's tort can seek recovery only from
the tortfeasor.3 1 °
The default management scheme for a domestic partnership
tracks that of the business partnership. Each partner has "equal
rights in the management and conduct" of the domestic
partnership. 1 ' Although domestic partners will doubtless perform
different tasks and allocate responsibilities in varying ways, the
UDPA favors equality among participants from the outset.31 2
Partnership decisions require unanimity (or at least an agreement
to disagree and consensus concerning a planned course of action).3 13
As in the business partnership context, domestic partners must
disclose "true and full information" to each other." 4 This obligation
applies not only in the context of partnership formation discussed
previously," 5 but also as an ongoing duty. For example, a partner
who incurs significant gambling debt or enters into an inconsistent,
extra-partnership relationship has a clear duty of disclosure. Less
clear is the disclosure obligation of a partner who is flirting with the
idea of entering into an extra-partnership relationship. The legal
presumption, however, remains in favor of disclosure. Despite this
disclosure duty, the state has no authority to police the inner
workings of a domestic partnership, unless or until either party
raises a breach of fiduciary duty claim in the context of a dissolution
proceeding, discussed infra.

medical care under doctrine of necessaries regardless of their religious objections to
treatment).
310 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-7-4 (West 2006) ("A husband is not liable for the
contracts or torts of his wife."). Naturally, if both domestic partners are the tortfeasors, then
recovery against both would be appropriate.
311 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(e) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (1001).
312 Dobson recognizes the equality of spouses, even in allocating the homemaker's role to
the woman. See Focus on the Family, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
313 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 101 (2001).
314 Id. § 20, 6(II) U.L.A. 188 (2001).
315 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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3. Property. We propose that partners handle property in the
same way that community property states deal with marital
property.3 16 Generally speaking, disclosed individual gifts or
inheritances and preexisting individual assets remain separate
assets, 317 but all income earned during the existence of the domestic
partnership or given to the domestic partnership by any party is
domestic partnership income, and any asset purchased therewith
becomes a domestic partnership asset.3 18 This characterization of
assets applies regardless of the names appearing on title documents.
The default ownership interest of domestic partnership income (and
thus domestic partnership assets purchased with that income) is
equal.3 1 9 Domestic partners, however, just like general partners,
can vary that split ex ante.32 °
With respect to creditors and bankruptcy, our proposal results in
little change. The UDPA treats real property owned by domestic
partners in the same way as property owned by a general
partnership: a creditor of solely one partner cannot attach or
execute against that partner's share of the asset.3 2 ' In modern
property terms, the domestic partners hold real property via a
tenancy by the entirety.3 2 2 By contrast, a creditor can attach a

316

See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2004) (declaring all property acquired by spouse

during marriage to be community property); see also Roselli v. Rio Cmtys. Serv. Station, Inc.,
787 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1990) (holding that each spouse has right to manage and dispose of
community's personal property subject to a fiduciary duty to other spouse). The nine
community property states in the United States are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof,
Community Property States, httpJ/marriage.about.com/od/finances/g/property.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
3 7 Any preexisting individual asset that is not disclosed in the formation document is
presumed to be a gift to the domestic partnership.
318 In community property states, an individual's premarriage assets can become
community property if the assets are commingled with family assets or used for the marriage,
in which case a gift to community property is presumed. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 852(d)
(West 2004) (providing that requirements for transmutation of property do not apply to
commingled community and separate assets).
319 Id. § 751.
320 See infra APPENDIX A.
321 See supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
322 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-17-3-1 (West 2006) (providing contract between husband
and wife for real property creates tenancy by the entirety). One commentator provides:
The primary difference between tenancy by the entirety and joint tenancy
is that joint tenants may deal with the property as they wish. If one joint
tenant decides to convey her interest in the property, that interest is
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debtor partner's share of other assets, subject to any other
applicable laws, 23 but cannot typically attach the debtor's domestic
partner's assets. A domestic partner would have all the potential
"marital benefits" available under the U.S. bankruptcy code. 24
4. Children. The possibility of parenting children creates an
obvious and enormous distinction between business partnerships
and domestic partnerships. Securing the welfare of children has
always been an important function of marriage-one that in recent
times it has failed to perform adequately 325-and is also one of the
important motivations for this proposal. Accordingly, the UDPA
provides default rules designed to protect and benefit children.3 26
Although clearly not property and rarely thought of as a burden,
children bear some similarities to both property and liabilities.
As with liabilities, domestic partners are jointly responsible for
all necessary maintenance of children.3 2 7 Parent partners may

conveyed, and the joint tenancy is destroyed. In tenancy by the entirety,
each tenant effectively owns the entire estate. Therefore, neither can deal
with the property independently of the other. The main advantage of this
difference is that judgment creditors of one party cannot enforce their liens
against the property. If the debtor spouse dies first, the lien can never be
enforced against the property. Of course, if the non-debtor spouse dies
first, the lien could be enforced.
Thomas 0. Moens, Attorney, Moens Law Offices, Tenancy by the Entirety (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://www.thomasmoens.com/tenancy-bythe-entirety.htm.
" States vary in terms of the exemptions provided for jointly held assets. For example,
Indiana provides exemptions for certain kinds of annuities, life insurance, and retirement
plans. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-14 (1998) (providing exemption for life insurance); § 272-5-1(b) (restricting alienation by beneficiary); § 34-6-2-131 (providing exemption for
retirement plans); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000) (providing exemption for pension
plans).
" See Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to
Pay Each Other's Debts?, 78 B.U. L. REV. 961, 964 (1998) (describing "marital benefits" in
bankruptcy code, including the right to "file a joint petition; . . . shield specific types of
property from creditors; include expenses for a non-debtor spouse in a bankruptcy budget;
and . . . protect a non-debtor spouse from certain debt collection activities"). Professor
Dickerson questions the practice of promoting marriage through the bankruptcy code, even
assuming that promoting marriage may be good public policy. Id. at 964-66.
" See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
.26Domestic partners can, of course, just like business partners, agree to arrangements
that unilaterally provide additional protection or benefits for third parties. Some filial
domestic partners, for example, might believe that paying for their children to attend college
is a worthwhile expense, deciding that a mutual commitment to such an expense might
prevent opportunistic behavior later.
327 Partners are presumed to be parents of children born during the partnership unless
evidence establishes a lack of biological parentage.
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waive this duty only to the degree that the non-waiving partner can
adequately provide for the children. Children, referred to as
domestic dependents under this proposal, are in some respects
similar to limited partners. Provided for under several versions of
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,328 limited partners are owed
fiduciary duties.3 29 Unlike general partners, however, limited
partners have no right to manage or control the partnership.3 3 °
Domestic dependents likewise have no right to manage or control
the domestic partnership.
The duty of care owed domestic dependents also loosely
resembles the management of business property. Recall that a
general partner cannot assign or transfer the right to participate in
management, including the management of a partnership's
property.3 3 ' Domestic partners similarly enjoy the right (and duty)
to participate in the raising of the children.3 32 Parents cannot
typically waive this duty-absent the approval of a court or relevant
child protection authority-which is consistent with the "best
interests of the child" standard.3 3 Our proposal reduces the risk of
an economically stronger domestic partner compelling a weaker
domestic partner to cede access to and control of the children in the

s3 See generallyUNIF. LTD. P'SHIPACT § 408 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 62 (2001) (explaining rights
and duties of partners); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'sHIP ACT § 403 (1976), 6A U.L.A. 365 (2001)
(amended 1985) (RULPA) (same). Most states now follow either RULPA or the Amendments
to RULPA.
" General partners in fact owe even greater fiduciary duties to limited partners than
partners mutually owe each other in a general partnership, because in the limited
partnership context a general partner will typically have exclusive power to control and
manage the partnership. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981);
Ebest v. Bruce, 734 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that general partners are
accountable as trustees to limited partners).
330 See UNIF. LTD. P'SmP ACT § 303 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 46 (2001) (explaining that limited
partners are not liable for limited partnership's obligations unless he is also general partner
or participates in control of business). Limited partners are typically limited to a right to
obtain partnership information, id. § 305, 6A U.L.A. 51 (2001), and in unusual situations to
bring a derivative suit against the general partnership on behalf of the partnership itself.
Id. §§ 1001-1004, 6A U.L.A. 102-03 (2001). Typically, a limited partner who exercises control
over the partnership loses the benefits of being a limited partner. Id. § 303, 6A U.L.A. 46
(2001).
331UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 27(1) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 332 (2001).
332 See infra APPENDIX A.
33'This proposal also is not radical. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jackson, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d
365, 372 (2006) ("A court cannot enter a judgment terminating parental rights based solely
upon the parties' stipulation that the child's mother or father relinquishes those rights.").
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event of dissolution. Courts will give weight to ex ante designations
of custody made apparent on a partnership application. Of course,
a judge could terminate a domestic partner's access to a child
against that domestic partner's wishes if the judge found
termination to be in the best interests of the child.34 As under the
current family law system, the best interests of the child control
final determinations.
Sometimes both partners change their minds about whether they
want children. Other times only one domestic partner might change
his mind. Occasionally unintended children are conceived. Table 1
addresses how the UDPA treats such children, unintended at the
time of the formation of domestic partnership. In all cases involving
unplanned children, the standard of proof is clear and convincing
evidence to reduce the chances of opportunistic behavior.3 5

4 See generally Jenina Mella, TerminationofParentalRights Based on Abuse or Neglect,
in 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 483 (2d ed. 2005). No compensation would be due a partner whose
access to a child was involuntarily terminated because such a termination would necessarily
involve the partner's fault. That same partner might still owe child support as a continuing
duty, however.
" The "clear and convincing" standard, necessitates that the parent attempting to avoid
responsibility prove that the child is not his or her biological relation. Typically, DNA
evidence will suffice to relieve a party of responsibility for a child.

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

414

[Vol. 41:349

TABLE 1 PROVISIONS FOR CHILDREN, UNINTENDED AT
3 36
THE TIME OF PARTNERSHIP FORMATION
CIRCUMSTANCES
RE CONCEPTION*

PRIMARY FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE CHILD 3

Both partners
welcome the
unplanned child

Both partners

N/A

Neither partner
intended
conception-no

Both partners

N/A

Default

Partner A was
negligent

A

B is responsible

Probably none
(negligence
unlikely to be a

Partner A was
negligent & B is
NOT the DNA co-

A (and the other
biological parent)

B is NOT
responsible

Grounds for
dissolution (waiver
of breach allowed)

Partner A acted
intentionally

A

B is responsible

Grounds for
dissolution (waiver

Partner A acted
intentionally & B
is NOT the DNA

A (and the other
biological parent)

B is NOT
responsible

Grounds for
dissolution (waiver
of breach allowed)

A (and the other
biological parent)

B is NOT
responsible

Grounds for
dissolution (waiver
of breach allowed)

B's FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IF
A HAS INADEQUATE

IMPACT ON
PARTNERSHIP

RESOURCES

Partnership
agreement modified
to default (filial
domestic
partnership)

"fault"

material breach)

parent

of breach allowed)

co-parent

A's undisclosed
knowledge of a
pregnancy or
child, or a reckless
disregard, at the
time of formation

I

I

*Eitherpartner,ora thirdparty, has standingto disprovePartner
B's parental relation to establish another's parenthood.
Establishingparenthoodmust take place within two years of when
the partnerorputativeparentknows, or should have known, of the
actualparentageof the child.3 38

' Domestic partners, regardless of type, in their initial filing are asked whether they
intend to have children. This table applies only to those partners who do not so intend or to
children conceived in breach of a partner's fiduciary duty (e.g., adultery).
337 Parental rights, such as visitation rights, are granted to Partner B only if B accepts
joint primary liability when B is otherwise not legally required to do so.
"' See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-5-3 (2003) (limiting paternity contests to two year
period following birth of child).
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5. Fiduciary Duties. Business partners owe a robust fiduciary
duty of loyalty to each other-or "the punctilio of an honor the most
Their
sensitive"3 9 in Judge Cardozo's talismanic words.34 °
3 4 ' Likewise, domestic
relationship is one of trust and confidence.
partners should have a relationship of trust and confidence.3 42
Accordingly, they too are bound to each other by a broad duty of the
"finest loyalty" for the duration of the domestic partnership.3 4 3
Extending general partnerships, domestic partners' fiduciary duties
expand to protect any children 3 4 4-the domestic dependents (or
limited partners)34 5-regardless of whether the adults' domestic
partnership survives.
6. Termination. Any business partner can withdraw at any time
from any partnership, whether the form is at-will, for a term, or for
a particular undertaking, thereby dissolving the partnership.3 4 6 The
consequences of dissolution, however, vary depending on whether
the partner's withdrawal was rightful or wrongful.3 4 v Wrongful
withdrawal can result in damages to the other partner, which the
wrongfully withdrawing partner may be obligated to cover."
339 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 550 (N.Y. 1928).
'
Daniel Kleinberger refers to Cardozo's words as "probably the most often quoted
passage in all of partnership law." DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
LLCS 259 (2d ed. 2002).

id.
342 Of course, domestic partners should also have a relationship of fidelity, faith, and
341

honor. These terms, along with loyalty, form the "basic vocabulary" of fiduciary law. Tamar
Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 829-30 (1983) (noting that "[c]ourts regulate
fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them" and that "[tihis moral theme
is an important part of fiduciary law").
m The fiduciary duty of care is not independently relevant to our proposal. Intentional
misconduct, knowing violations of the law, and perhaps repeated reckless conduct might,
however, sometimes result in a breach of the duty of loyalty.
' See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA. L.
REV. 2401 (1995) (developing model of parents as fiduciaries and applying model to family law
today).
' General partners also owe fiduciary duties to limited partners. See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP
ACT § 408(1), 6A U.L.A. 62 (2001) (requiring that general partners owe only duty of loyalty
and care to other limited partners).
3" See supra notes 243-72 and accompanying text.
347 See supra notes 243-72 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 243-72 and accompanying text. Partners may also opt ex ante to
impose not only damages but also a financial penalty on a partner who wrongfully withdraws
or materially breaches a fiduciary duty. See supra notes 243-72 and accompanying text.
Damages and penalties accrue in addition to any anticipated support obligations following a
rightful withdrawal or mutually agreed upon termination. See supra notes 243-72 and
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We propose a similar scheme for the dissolution and termination
of domestic partnerships. Any domestic partner can dissolve a
domestic partnership at any time simply by filing a petition with the
court.34 9
When the court grants the petition, the domestic
partnership terminates.3 5 ° If the other domestic partner voluntarily
agrees, the dissolution is not wrongful and there are no special
penalties beyond any regular termination results specified on the
original domestic partnership form. As under traditional divorce
law, the UDPA may entitle either the dissolving or cooperating
partner with financial support beyond the unwinding of the
partnership.
For an enduring domestic partnership in which both parties
pursue careers outside the home, we envision no such continuing
support liabilities, unless unintended children are born.3 5'
Similarly, if a provisional domestic partnership ends before the year
elapses, a partner may owe damages, but the quantum of damages
is unlikely to be high.3 52 Potential for a larger financial settlement
appears much more likely in the filial domestic partnership or
caregiving domestic partnership when one domestic partner is more
likely to have left the field of paid employment to provide other
benefits to the partnership. Dissolving a domestic partnership
never ends the domestic partners' obligation towards any domestic
dependents.
If, however, the domestic partners do not agree on dissolution,
and either the term of the partnership has not expired (provisional
domestic partnership) or the domestic dependents are not yet adults
(filial domestic partnership), the early dissolution may be wrongful.

accompanying text.
"4 After all, a domestic partner who no longer wishes to be part of the domestic
partnership is unlikely to provide effective emotional support. The period between dissolution
and termination is analogous to the unwinding period of general partnership law.
"5 We, perhaps optimistically, anticipate that termination will usually be a relatively
simple matter since partners will have elected, ex ante, the terms of dissolution. See infra
APPENDIX B, § 32.
351 See supra notes 336-37 and accompanying text. As explained in Table 1, a domestic
partner might owe support for a child only if the other partner has inadequate resources.
"2 Again, however, if an unintended child or pregnancy results from this partnership,
continuing financial support may be owed to the child's custodial parent.
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A partner who terminates early and wrongfully may face penalties
consistent with what the parties agreed ex ante.
Alternatively, a domestic partner faced with a material breach of
fiduciary duties may, just as in the business partnership, seek a
court order for dissolution.3 53 Consistent with the language of the
UPA, courts should grant dissolution if a domestic partner is "guilty
of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on" of
the domestic partnership,3 54 or "willfully or persistently" breaches
the domestic partnership agreement, or "otherwise so conducts
himself in matters relating to the partnership" that "it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on" the domestic partnership. 5 5 The
court could also decree a dissolution if "circumstances render a
dissolution equitable."3 56 Such a court order, if granted, both
dissolves the partnership and prevents a finding of wrongful
dissolution against the partner seeking the court order. In
appropriate circumstances, where the breach of fiduciary duties is
sufficiently egregious, a court might impose additional penalties.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION-PERSONALIZED

The UDPA could provide a consistent, national family law model.
Although a good idea in theory, how would it work in reality? The
transition period actually would be relatively straightforward.
Present day marriage with no-fault divorce and civil unions most
resemble the enduring domestic partnership.
Accordingly,
transitional law would place any existing marriage or civil union
into that category by default in order to minimize changes to
existing spouses' legal rights and obligations. Spouses may,
however, by mutual agreement, opt into other forms of domestic
partnership by filing the appropriate form. "'
m See supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. We anticipate that a partner could
move for dissolution absent a material breach when, for example, a partner becomes
incapacitated. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(1)(a)-(c) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 404
(2001) (explaining that dissolution is allowed when partner is declared lunatic, becomes
incapable of performing partnership duties, or is guilty of conduct prejudicial to partnership).
354 UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(1)(c) (1914) (amended 1997), 6(11) U.L.A. 404 (2001).
315Id. § 32(1)(d).
36 Id. § 32(1)(f).
3' For the possible financial benefit of children we would hope that married parents would
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Let us return to our couples from Part III.E.358 Alice and Betty
might choose not to form a filial partnership because neither wants
to be responsible for paying support should the other "fall in love"
and opt to dissolve their partnership to form a new one with a
romantic lover. They love each other and their children dearly but
are not homosexual and therefore want flexibility to enter into a
romantic domestic partnership at some future point. Under these
circumstances, a provisional domestic partnership might work well
for them.
If they decide down the road that they like their arrangement,
they can renew with a caregiving domestic partnership for a five
year duration that will see them through the high school graduation
of the youngest child. Assume that by this time Betty has been out
of the work force for awhile and knows she will need to update her
skills to reenter the job market. Alice promises to continue
supporting Betty for another year should they choose not to renew
in five years while Betty prepares for reentry. A common provision
is a year of support for every two years of domestic service and
loyalty,35 9 but Betty feels that she can be ready in one year. Should
they choose to remain together for longer, they will need to reassess
their circumstances and affirmatively make new arrangements.
Father Colin and Dolores also agree to a caregiving domestic
partnership. When he retires, she continues to care for him, and the
two collect and share their modest pensions from the Church. When
either dies, the other remains financially solvent by collecting the
Social Security survivor benefits.3 6 °
Eric, Frank, Isabella, and Hank have very different lives under
our proposal; they can all be much more secure. Eric and Frank

affirmatively choose to transition into filial domestic partners. See infra APPENDIX A (listing

domestic partnership forms).
m See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
3" See Jana B. Singer, DivorceReform and GenderJustice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117-18

(1989) (explaining income sharing after couples separate and proposing one year of income
sharing for two years of marriage).
3' In response to Lewis v. Harris,908 A.2d 196,221 (2006), some conservative New Jersey
legislators have proposed extending "equal benefits" to homosexual couples, siblings, and
others in domestic partnerships. This proposal seems consistent with our approach for
couples like Alice and Betty and Colin and Dolores. Geoff Mulvihill, N.J. Conservatives Float
Same-Sex Rights Bill, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 27, 2006, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2006/11127/AR2006112701079-pf.html.
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choose a filial domestic partnership recognized in every state and
based on business partnership law. Their children are domestic
dependents, and because they were born during the partnership,
they are presumed children of the partnership.3"' Should either
partner choose to terminate the partnership before the children
become emancipated,3 6 2 Eric will owe Frank child and partner
support until the youngest child reaches emancipation and for a
term beyond that time for Frank to prepare to reenter the paid
workforce.' 6 3 Although the end of a domestic partnership, like the
end of almost any close personal relationship, is unlikely to be
happy, ex ante planning reduces the chance of acrimony because
Frank and Eric have thought about and addressed the key
termination issues in advance. Of course, if either materially
breaches his fiduciary duty of loyalty, the other can seek a courtordered termination and impose penalties against the transgressing
partner. The court's charge will include minimizing the negative
impact on Hank and Isabella, the domestic dependents.
Lisa and Mike also select a filial domestic partnership because,
even though they both work, they intend to have children. They
think that one of them might want to leave the workforce, even
temporarily, to care for those children at home. Thus, they want
flexibility and protection to enable them to make responsible
parenting choices. Since they hope to remain together for life, they
decide in advance that their partnership will become an enduring
one once their children are emancipated. However, they also agree
in advance that they will each contribute to their children's college
and graduate education in proportion to their earning capacities.
They agree that this obligation will end when each child reaches the
age of twenty-five.
Kathy and Jos6 enter into an enduring domestic partnership.
Under this agreement, Kathy is not liable for the support of Jos6's

31

See supra note 326 and accompanying text.

362 Some domestic partners might choose an even longer period, such as the earlier of the

child's completing college or turning twenty-five.
' Or perhaps Frank has a large trust fund. Then Frank and Eric might agree to waive
child and partner support either at the formation of the domestic partnership or afterwards.
Of course, such a waiver would be valid with respect to Hank and Isabella only to the extent
Frank remains solvent and can adequately provide for them.
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children unless Kathy and Josd both opt on the partnership
application to share all of Jos6's parenting rights and liabilities. 6 4
If they do not so opt initially, they can later change their agreement
by filing an amendment with the clerk's office. Jos6 remains liable
for the financial support of these children and his former partner
(i.e., ex-wife), if a court ordered any support previously. If Kathy
gives birth to a child, the law presumes the child is of their
partnership and has the benefits of a limited partner as a domestic
dependent. 6 5 Neither Kathy nor Jos6 can opt out of support
obligations to that child.
While not comprehensive, this survey of how domestic
partnerships might work in practice offers a glimpse of how
partnership law might better facilitate domestic ordering for the
protection of all families.
VI. CONCLUSION

Domestic partnership gives people the ability to organize their
domestic lives and to protect their loved ones financially. It does not
guarantee a "happily ever after" ending. Nothing, not even
marriage, can guarantee that. A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act
would secure, however, the parentage and welfare of children born
to a partnership and also better provide for stepchildren.
Additionally, this proposal would encourage people to negotiate ex
ante, in an efficient and economical way, to structure their domestic
lives. Finally, state and federal governments could subsidize and
foster familial bonding by conferring rights and privileges on those
individuals who form partnerships to care for each other and
dependents. Governments could endorse familial sacrifice and
loyalty without makingjudgments about sexuality and other private
conduct that may have no bearing on the health of the family. Anne
Roiphe once wrote, "I know that family life in America is a

3"Josd cannot give away what he does not hold, namely his former partner's parenting
rights and liabilities. However, a court might later award Kathy those rights if the mother
materially breaches her fiduciary duties to the children.
. Jos6 or another person can rebut the presumption of paternity via a DNA challenge.
However neither sperm nor egg donors, identified by name or anonymously by contract, have
the right to challenge parentage.
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minefield, an economic trap for women, a study in disappointment
for both sexes."366 If her assessment is true, and it may very well be,
let's change American family life starting today.

ANNE ROIPHE, LOVINGKINDNESS 131 (Summit Books, 1987).
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A: DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP APPLICATION

1. APPLICANT INFORMATION
APPLICANT

CO-APPLICANT

Name: Last, First Middle

Name: Last, First Middle

Former Name

Former Name

Birthplace, City & State

Birth Date

Birthplace, City & State

Birth Date

Street Address

Street Address

Intended Partnership Residence

Intended Partnership Residence

Occupation

Occupation

Current Partnership Status

Current Partnership Status

o Never Partnered

0 Never Partnered

" Previously Partnered - Partnership
terminated by
O Elapse of 1 Year (Provisional Only)
Date of termination
o3Court decree
Court file number:
City granted in:
0 Partner's Death

0 Previously Partnered - Partnership
terminated by
0 Elapse of 1 Year (Provisional Only)
Date of termination
03 Court decree
Court file number:
City granted in:
0 Partner's Death

Applicant's First Parent's Name:
Last, First

Co-Applicant's First Parent's Name:
Last, First

Former Name

Former Name

Residence, City, State

Residence, City, State

Second Parent's Name:

Second Parent's Name:

Last, First

Last, First

Former Name

Former Name

Residence, City, State

Residence, City, State

I DECLARE THAT ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED IS
TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE:

I DECLARE THAT ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED IS
TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY
KNOWLEDGE:

APPLICANT SIGNATURE

CO-APPLICANT SIGNATURE

Date:

Date:
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THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC.
THIS IS A LEGAL DOCUMENT.
YOUR ANSWERS AND ANY ATTACHED SHEETS WILL HAVE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES.
PLEASE CONSIDER YOUR CHOICES CAREFULLY.
2. PARTNERSHIP FORM
What form of partnership do you wish to enter? (check only one) [NOTE: These category descriptions
are meant as a guide only.]
o ENDURING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP-most appropriate for couples who both work for taxable

income and who do NOT intend to have children
o PROVISIONAL DOmEsTC PARTNERSHIP-most appropriate for couples who wish to try domestic

partnership for a one year period
" FILIAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP-most appropriate for couples who intend to have children together
[l CAREGIVING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP-most appropriate for couples who plan to have only one
partner work full-time for taxable income and who do NOT intend to have children
3. CHILDREN [NOTE: A COURT CAN USE THIS INFORMATION IN AWARDING CUSTODY.]
List current pregnancies, children under age 18, and adult dependents for whom you are financially
responsible:
APPLICANT

CO-APPLICANT

If either applicant already has one or more minor children, do both applicants agree to share
formal, legal parenting rights and responsibilities (including financial support) for those children?
YES 0 NO O N/A 0

IF YES, attach a separate sheet describing any firm agreements.

Do you intend to have additional children during the partnership? S YES
IF YES:
How many? (check one)

ONE S

TWO S

THREE S

FOUR 0

S NO

MORE THAN FOUR S

Who will be the primary caregiver for young children? (check one)
APPLICANT 0

CO-APPLICANT S

BOTH S

ANOTHER CARE PROVIDER S

If this partnership terminates before all children reach age 18, who will have custody of minor
children? (check one)
APPLICANT S

CO-APPLICANT S

BOTH S

Please confirm that you have discussed parenting issues (e.g., religious training and education,
corporal discipline, financial support for post-secondary education, etc.):
YES, WE HAVE DISCUSSED PARENTING ISSUES S
Attach a separate sheet describing any firm agreements.
IF NO:
Have you discussed how to prevent an unintended pregnancy? YES S N/A 0
Have you discussed what you will do about an unintended pregnancy? YES S N/A S
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4. ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
List any individually held assets (e.g., land, homes, cars, stocks, jewelry, etc.):
[Attach additional sheets if necessary. NOTE: ANY ASSETS NOT LISTED WILL BE PRESUMED TO BE
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS.]
APPLICANT

CO-APPLICANT

List any individual liabilities (e.g., mortgages, child support, former partner support, car loans,
student loans, gambling debts, etc.):
APPLICANT

CO-APPLICANT

5. HEALTH AND ASSOCIATED DECLARATIONS
Have you disclosed any significant physical or mental disabilities or conditions (e.g., known genetic
risks, HIV/AIDS or other transmissible diseases, cancers, schizophrenia, etc.):

APPLICANT (check one)

CO-APPLICANT (check one)

Has nothing to disclose 0

Has nothing to disclose 0

Has disclosed condition(s) [ including:

Has disclosed condition(s) 0 including:

Attach a separate sheet if you wish to make specific confidential disclosures.

6. MISCELLANEOUS PARTNERSHIP RIGHTS AND DUTIES
Optional: Describe below or on a separate sheet any special agreements (e.g., "We will visit our
respective parents every other year."; "Partners will divide household chores equally.")
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7. DURATION AND TERMINATION
[NOTE: A court may use this information to determine partner obligation after dissolution.]
Complete this section based upon your selection in Section 2. ANSWER ONLY ONE OF A, B, C, OR D.
A. IF YOU CHOOSE AN ENDURING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
DURATION: An Enduring Partnership is intended to last for life.
We intend to stay together for life 0
We have agreed to a different duration 0

How long?

ASSETS & LIABILITIES: Upon termination (because of death without a will, term expiration, or
dissolution),
We will divide partnership assets and liabilities equally 0
We have agreed to an unequal division 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

SUPPORT: If either partner terminates the domestic partnership before the time indicated above:
Neither partner will owe the other continuing financial support 0
We have agreed to different support provisions 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

B. IF YOU CHOOSE A PROVISIONAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
DURATION: A Provisional Partnership is intended to last for one year. After a year, unless the
partners agree to renew, the partnership will automatically terminate.
ASSETS & LIABILITIES: Upon termination (because of death without a will, term expiration, or
dissolution),
We will divide partnership assets and liabilities equally 0
We have agreed to an unequal division 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

SUPPORT: If either partner terminates the domestic partnership before the time indicated above:
Neither partner will owe the other continuing financial support 0
We have agreed to different support provisions 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

C. IF YOU CHOOSE A FILIAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
DURATION: A Filial Partnership is intended to last until the emancipation of the youngest child, when
it becomes a Caregiving Partnership. You may select a different option. We choose (check one):
A Caregiving Partnership 0

An Enduring Partnership 0

OR Termination 0

ASSETS & LIABILITIES: Upon termination (because of death without a will, term expiration, or
dissolution),
We will divide partnership assets and liabilities equally 0
We have agreed to an unequal division 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

[OPTION C. IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE.]
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C. IF YOU CHOOSE A FILIAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP (CONTINUED)
SUPPORT: If either partner terminates the domestic partnership before the time indicated
above, and one partner has primary child care responsibilities, the other partner will owe the
caregiving partner continuing financial support
Until the youngest child is emancipated or for one year for every two years
of partnership, whichever is longer 0
We have agreed to different support provisions 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

D. IF YOU CHOOSE A CAREGIVING DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
DURATION: A Caregiving Partnership is intended to last for life.
We intend to stay together for life 0
We have agreed to a different duration [

How long?

ASSETS & LIABILITIES: Upon termination (because of death without a will, term expiration, or
dissolution),
We will divide partnership assets and liabilities equally 0
We have agreed to an unequal division 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

SUPPORT: If either partner terminates the domestic partnership before the time indicated
above, the primary income earning partner will owe the caregiving partner or adult domestic
dependent continuing financial support
For one year for every two years of partnership 0
We have agreed to different support provisions 0

Attach a description of your agreement.

8. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
CHILD SUPPORT: In all cases with any partnership, if you have parented a child you will be
responsible to support the child should that child need support.
At partnership termination, a court may alter the above distributions and any partner financial
agreements if they would result in undue hardship or unfairness. If there is an early termination, do
you want the court to consider the circumstances that led up to the termination? (e.g., infidelity,
addition, undisclosed liabilities, etc.) (check one)
No, we want a no-fault partnership 0
Yes, consider all circumstances 0
Yes, consider the circumstances listed on the attached sheet 0
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B: SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIP ACT

ARTICLE 1. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS
Chapter 1. Uniform Domestic Partnership Act
§1
SHORT TITLE

Sec. 1. This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Domestic
Partnership Act.
§6
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP DEFINED

Sec. 6. (1) A domestic partnership is an association of two (2) adult
persons to form a single economically and emotionally supportive
family. A family is defined as a group consisting of parents and
their children or a group of persons who typically live together and
have a shared commitment to a domestic relationship.
(2) A marriage performed in any state is an enduring domestic
partnership under this chapter, unless the parties opt for a different
domestic partnership form prior to January 1, 2008; and this
chapter shall apply to domestic partnerships except insofar as the
statutes relating to such domestic partnerships are inconsistent
with this chapter.

§ 18
RULES DETERMINING RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS

Sec. 18. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the
domestic partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by the following rules:
(a) Any partner contributions, whether by way of capital or
advances to the domestic partnership property shall be presumed a
gift to the domestic partnership and partners shall share equally in
the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including
those to partners, are satisfied; and except as provided in section
15(2) of this chapter, each partner must contribute toward the
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losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the domestic
partnership according to her share in the profits.
(b) All partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the domestic partnership.
(c) No partner is entitled to remuneration for conducting the
domestic partnership activities.
(d) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected
with the domestic partnership activities may be decided by one
partner; but no act in contravention of any agreement between the
partners may be done rightfully without the consent of the other
partner.
(e) Persons may serve as a domestic partner in only one
domestic partnership at a time. No partner shall enter into another
domestic partnership until a prior partnership is terminated.

§ 20
DUTY OF PARTNERS TO RENDER INFORMATION
Sec. 20. Partners shall render on demand true and full information
of all things affecting the domestic partnership to the other partner
or the legal representative of that partner.
§ 29
DISSOLUTION DEFINED

Sec. 29. The dissolution of a domestic partnership is the change in
the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be
associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up
of the family's activities.

§30
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP NOT TERMINATED BY DISSOLUTION

Sec. 30. On dissolution the domestic partnership is not terminated,
but continues until the winding up of domestic partnership affairs
is completed.
§ 31
CAUSES OF DISSOLUTION

Sec. 31. Dissolution is caused:
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners:
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(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular
undertaking specified in the domestic partnership application or
agreement.
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or
particular undertaking is specified.
(c) By the expulsion of a partner from the family bona fide in
accordance with such a power conferred by the domestic partnership
application or agreement between the partners.
(d) By mutual consent of the partners.
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners,
where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any
other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner at
any time.
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the activities of the
domestic partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry it
on in domestic partnership.
(4) By the death of any partner.
(5) By decree of court under section 32 of this chapter.
§ 32
DISSOLUTION BY DECREE OF COURT

Sec. 32. On application by or for a partner, the court shall decree a
dissolution whenever:
(1) A partner has been declared mentally incompetent in any
judicial proceeding.
(2) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing
the partner's part of the domestic partnership agreement.
(3) A partner has been guilty of conduct that tends to affect
prejudicially the family or the carrying on of the partnership.
(4) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the
domestic partnership agreement, or otherwise acts in matters
relating to the family so that it is not reasonably practicable to carry
on the domestic partnership with that partner.
(5) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.

